The Spread of Sharecropping in Tuscany: The Political Economy of Transaction Costs

Emigh, Rebecca Jean

doi:10.2307/2657314

Cited by 34 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…A drop in wheat prices and an increase in demand for wine made investments in wine more attractive. 35 In addition, the introduction of sharecropping as an institutional innovation reduced labor supervision costs and increased the profitability of vineyards investments (Emigh, 1997).…”

Section: The Delimitation Of Chianti Wine 32mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…"quello che posso dire è che mi dispiace d'averne avuto si poca qualità, perché (...) ho avuto più richieste che vino, non mi mandi mai meno di 10 casse per volta." (Filza 61 of the Ricasoli Archive, Archivio di Stato di Firenze).38 SeeEmigh (1997) for an analysis of the political economy in late medieval and early modern in Tuscany and the active role of the urban merchants that used sharecropping to diversify their portfolio and invest on agriculture. For our analysis, it is also important to underline that Florence was, at that time, the political and economic center of Tuscany, attracting capital and trade, and merchants were therefore extremely powerful.39 Litchfield (1969) underlines the fact that these aristocratic families were still the ruling class in Florence and, as "citizens", they were allowed to be elected in the Senate and held important positions in the government.40 FedericoMelis (1972) also evidences the presence of British and Italian importers by analyzing the accounts of Pier Giuseppe Migliorini, who, in 1699, made a list of wines sold in London, and Chianti appears in it.41 The first accounting record mentioning "Chianti" as a separate Tuscan wine was registered in 1394-even though it was still produced as a white (and not a red) wine(Melis, 1972).…”

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Trade and terroir. The political economy of the world’s first geographical indications

Meloni

Swinnen

2018

Food Policy

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The world's first geographical indications (GIs) were in the wine sector and focused on the delineation of the location of production, the 'terroir': the Burgundy wines in the fifteenth century, the Port wines and Chianti wines in the eighteenth century, and the Champagne wines in the early twentieth century. We analyze the causes for the introduction of these GIs ('terroirs') and for changes in their delineation (expansion) later on. Our analysis shows that trade played a very important role in the creation of the 'terroirs' but not always through the same mechanisms. For the Port and Chianti GIs it was exports to Britain that were crucial; for Burgundy it was domestic trade to Paris; and for the Champagne GI it was not exports but pressure from wine imports and new wine regions that played a crucial role. For the expansions of the GIs later in history, other factors seem to have been equally important. Expansions of the GIs in the years and centuries after their introduction followed major changes in political power; the spread of a new philosophy in liberal and free markets across Europe; and infrastructure investments which opened up markets and made exports cheaper from "new" producers.

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Section: The Delimitation Of Chianti Wine 32mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade and terroir. The political economy of the world’s first geographical indications

Meloni

Swinnen

2018

Food Policy

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“…1 Rerolle (1888), Solmi (1923), Luzzatto (1948), Imberciadori (1961), Jones (1964;1968), Conti (1965), Herlihy (1967), Desplanques (1969), Giorgetti (1974), Ugolini (1978), Cammarosano (1979), Cherubini (1979), Pinto (1979), Piccinni (1982), Byres (1983), Epstein (1986), Pinto and Pirillo (1987), Muzzi and Nenci (1988), Cohen and Galassi (1990), Epstein (1994), Emigh (1997), Luporini and Parigi (1996), and Galassi, Meally, and Pudney (1998)…”

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confidence: 99%

The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?

Ackerberg¹,

Botticini²

2000

Explorations in Economic History

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“…Florentines were absentee landlords, whose primary occupations revolved around urban manufacturing or banking, not agriculture. Analyses of leases show that landlords used sharecropping to decrease costs associated with supervising labor and managing their physical properties, especially with the commonly grown Tuscan crops of olives and grapes, which required extensive capital outlays that could be easily damaged by mismanagement and which necessitated extensive hand labor (Emigh 1997b). …”

Section: Labour Use and Landlord Control In Tuscanymentioning

confidence: 98%

Labor Use and Landlord Control: Sharecropping and Household Structure in Fifteenth‐Century Tuscany

Emigh

1998

J Historical Sociology

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The prevalence of large and extended families among sharecroppers in northern and central Italy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been well documented in the historical demographic literature. Landlords relied on tenants' extended household structure to provide a large labor force that increased their income. In earlier centuries, however, landlords' involvement in agricultural production may have had little impact on household structure. Evidence from fifteenth-century Tuscany illustrates that household extension was not as common among sharecroppers during this period of time. Qualitative analyses of personal correspondence and tax declarations from the fifteenth century suggest reasons why landlords' management techniques did not lead to household extension among sharecroppers. Unlike landlords in later periods of time, fifteenth-century landlords relied more on rearranging plots of land than particular demographic practices, because land consolidation was still in progress and farms were not fixed geographically. In addition, during the earlier period of time, sharecropping was less institutionalized and landlords had less power over their tenants. These findings suggest that sharecropping, as a tenurial form, did not necessarily lead to household extension. Instead, the effect of the tenurial form depended on the nature of sharecropping and the degree of landlords' power.

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The Spread of Sharecropping in Tuscany: The Political Economy of Transaction Costs

Cited by 34 publications

References 41 publications

Trade and terroir. The political economy of the world’s first geographical indications

Trade and terroir. The political economy of the world’s first geographical indications

The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?

Labor Use and Landlord Control: Sharecropping and Household Structure in Fifteenth‐Century Tuscany

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