The Spectre Haunting Conservatism: Europe and Backbench Rebellion

Ludlam, Steve

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-24407-2_6

Cited by 14 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…The Conservative rebellions during the 1970s over entry into the EEC were described then as the 'most persistent Conservative intra-party dissent in post-war history' (Norton 1978, 80). The Maastricht rebellions easily usurped that title (Ludlam 1996;Sowemimo 1996). The average rebellion over the European Communities Bill in 1972 involved fewer than ten MPs (Ludlam 1996, 106).…”

Section: Rebels With Causesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rebels and Rebellions: Conservative MPs in the 1992 Parliament

Cowley

Norton

1999

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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During the 1992 Parliament the Conservative Party lost its reputation for unity. The parliamentary party, said by some to be unusually rebellious, got the blame. This article places the levels of dissent in the division lobbies of the House of Commons in historical perspective, comparing the 1992 Parliament with those before. Contrary to received wisdom, Conservative MPs were not noticeably more rebellious after 1992. The article also considers the ideological and factional basis of the rebellions. Because the rebellions in Parliament focused almost exclusively on Europe, the party remained one of tendencies, albeit well-organised and cohesive tendencies, rather than factions; and the extent to which the rebellions cut across existing ideological cleavages has been overstated.

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Section: Rebels With Causesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rebels and Rebellions: Conservative MPs in the 1992 Parliament

Cowley

Norton

1999

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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“…Even the Falklands episode could not revive past glories (Ludlam 1996;Sanders 1990). The handover of Hong Kong in 1997, negotiated by the Thatcher government, appeared the final chapter.…”

Section: Modern British Conservatism and Hyperglobalismmentioning

confidence: 96%

Sovereign Nations and Global Markets: Modern British Conservatism and Hyperglobalism

Baker

Gamble

Seawright

2002

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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In this article we seek to trace through the major stands of British Euroscepticism and concentrate, in particular, on the importance of a powerful 'hyperglobalist' Eurosceptical strand within British Conservatism. We investigate the British Conservatives' recent divisions over European integration, against the background of the party's increasingly marginal status in British party politics. The piece also draws on findings from two recent surveys of the attitudes of British parliamentarians to European integration, carried out by the Members of Parliament Project for the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). We explore how Conservative divisions of opinion are related in part to particular understandings of globalisation and regionalisation and attempt to show how globalist ideology has unexpectedly re-emphasised and bolstered the traditional nationalism of the Tory party and caused an increasingly hostile attitude amongst many British Conservatives towards the European project as it is presently constituted. We also examine recent attempts to map British Conservative Euroscepticism on to continental varieties using a mixture of ideological positioning and party system (Taggart 1998), arguing that this ignores the extent to which British Eurosceptics advance unique (in EU member state terms) hyperglobalist (rather than isolationist or protectionist) arguments in objecting to further European integration.

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“…Instead, after four years in office, Cameron has managed to unite most of his party and many former and present Tory voters in the suspicion that his statecraft represented a thinly veiled plot to keep the UK in Europe by duping the British people into voting in a referendum to stay in the EU which, even if untrue, means that it represents a dismally failed form of statecraft. At root this failure serves as an illustration of the impossibility of maintaining a workable strategic form of statecraft in the face of the dangerous obsession with Europe which has continuously wracked the Conservative Party from within since the mid-1980s, ending the careers of a number of party leaders, senior ministers and most notably Prime Minister Thatcher (Ludlam andSmith 1996, Baker andSeawright 1998). In many ways the Conservative Party has become increasingly trapped inside a post-Thatcher legacy on Europe, unable to move beyond it to take account of changing circumstances and national needs.…”

Section: The British Situationmentioning

confidence: 97%