The Spatial Content of Experience

Thompson, Brad

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00359.x

Cited by 37 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 40 publications

(49 reference statements)

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“…It will prove helpful in spelling out a more precise Russellian representationalist account of size experience to consider an example that Thompson (2010) has deployed against Russellian views of size perception, in the course of arguing for a Fregean account of size experience. It will turn out that there is a quite natural Russellian, vision‐science derived, precise account of size experience that meets the constraints highlighted by the Thompson example.…”

Section: The Russellian Representationalist View Of Size Experiencmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In part this is accomplished by offering refinements in response to various anticipated objections and proposed alternative views. This includes Thompson’s (2010) recently offered Doubled Earth example, advanced by Thompson as part of an argument for a Fregean account of size experience. I argue that my favored Russellian view handles the Doubled Earth example in a natural and illuminating way, thereby averting the need to posit irreducible experiential ‘modes of presentation’.…”

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confidence: 99%

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How the World Is Measured Up in Size Experience

Bennett

2011

Philos Phenomenol Research

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I develop a Russellian representationalist account of size experience that draws importantly from contemporary vision science research on size perception. The core view is that size is experienced in ‘body‐scaled’ units. So, an object might, say, be experienced as two eye‐level units high. The view is sharpened in response to Thompson’s (forthcoming) Doubled Earth example. This example is presented by Thompson as part of an argument for a Fregean view of size experience. But I argue that the Russellian view I develop handles the Doubled Earth example in a natural and illuminating way, thereby avoiding the need to posit irreducible experiential ‘modes of presentation’. I also address a kind of neo‐Fregean ‘reference‐fixing’ view of size experience, that shares features with the Russellian view developed. I give reasons for favoring the latter. Finally, I argue that Peacocke’s claim that spatial experience is ‘unit free’ is not persuasive.

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Section: The Russellian Representationalist View Of Size Experiencmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

How the World Is Measured Up in Size Experience

Bennett

2011

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…The predicate is interpreted as follows: N x: x is such that the NMA provides (direct) evidence for x 24 The rules for amending the Ramsey sentence with the N -predicate are very simple. Let ∀x...∃y...(P ) be a sentence in prenex normal form from the original theory, where P is an expression involving Ramsified predicates.…”

Section: Amending the Ramsey Sentencementioning

confidence: 99%

Newman’s Objection and the No Miracles Argument

Smithson

2016

Erkenn

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“… For example, Thompson () and Chalmers () argue that the way spatial properties appear in experience (Euclidean) may well be distinct from how those properties are. …”

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confidence: 99%

Perceiving Immaterial Paths

Cumhaill

2013

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In what sense does empty space feature in visual experience? In the first part of this essay I sketch a view advanced by Soteriou (2011) and Richardson (2009) on which one's visual awareness of empty space is explained by appeal to ‘structural’ features of the phenomenology of visual experience, in particular the phenomenology of experiencing one's visual field as bounded. I suggest that although this ‘structuralist’ view is silent on whether empty space has a phenomenal appearance, the very appeal to structural features seems a natural foil to some such thought. In the second part, I outline a view on which it can be granted that empty space does, after all, have a phenomenal appearance and, so, is not best cast as a species of absence perception as the structuralist avows, at least on a certain construal of ‘absence perception’. After O'Shaughnessy (2002), I contend that although some privations have a phenomenal appearance, ‘absence perception’ should single out the putative perception of phenomena that lack phenomenal reality. I finally consider how the descriptive phenomenology that the structuralist points to, and which I urge should be embraced, can nonetheless be reconciled with the view I spell out.

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The Spatial Content of Experience

Cited by 37 publications

References 40 publications

How the World Is Measured Up in Size Experience

How the World Is Measured Up in Size Experience

Newman’s Objection and the No Miracles Argument

Perceiving Immaterial Paths

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