The South African Strategic and Operational Objectives in Angola, 1987–88

Abstract

Ever since 1988, a war of words has been waged about the question who won the so-called Battle of Cuito Cuanavale -the SADF, or the Cuban and Angola forces. A lot depends, of course, on what the South Africans' strategic and operational objectives were, and whether they reached these or not. On a somewhat lower level, the debate has centred on the question whether the SADF wanted to occupy Cuito Cuanavale. If they did, it becomes easier to argue that South Africa was dealt a heavy reverse there; if not, such an argument becomes more difficult to sustain. In this article, South Africa's strategic and operational objectives are analysed, based on archival sources. The basic conclusions are that the South African government was realistic enough to see that it could not replace the MPLA with UNITA by force, although it was hoped this might happen through elections. As far as Cuito Cuanavale is concerned, the sources are unequivocal: Although the occupation of the town was indeed discussed, it was never seriously considered. The objective was simply to drive FAPLA over the Cuito River, to prepare the riverbank as a defensive line, to turn it over to UNITA and then to pull back. By far most of the South Africans' objectives were reached.

The Standard of Research on the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, 1987–1988

“…In addition, all primary sources point to South Africa realising that whatever it would have liked to do, it knew it did not have the necessary leverage to force a regime change in Luanda. 32 Gleijeses suggests rather than alleges that the SADF had its eyes fixed on Cuito Cuanavale. He writes, "By mid-January 1988 South African military sources and Western diplomats were announcing that the fall of Cuito was "imminent"."…”

“…In fact, South Africa never thought that it would be able to replace the MPLA as government with UNITA, the SADF never was "trapped", it never announced the capture of Cuito Cuanavale, there were never more than 3 000 South African troops engaged in this operation, losing air superiority did not affect the SADF operation decisively, 14 the story about "mutinies among black troops" is highly exaggerated, there was no "high casualty rate among whites", and President PW Botha"s visit to the front had a totally different context. 15 And yet Saney deems him a trustworthy source! Another example is Professor Gary Baines, historian at the Rhodes University in Grahamstown.…”

“…In operational terms, this meant that the Angolan forces either had to be destroyed east of the Cuito River or driven across it, that the river had to be prepared as a defensive position and turned over to UNITA, and that the SADF then had to pull back. 21 Of course, Baines did not have access to this research, which was at the time of his writing still only a glint in my eye. However, he bases his conclusions on articles by Ronnie Kasrils, Piero Gleijeses and Edgar Dosman, none of which are very trustworthy either.…”