The Sound of Silence in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Games

Bohnet, Iris

doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-5187-4_11

Cited by 103 publications

(135 citation statements)

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“…Now we are interested in how men and women face the proposer's decision. To this end, we compare the second and third models presented in table 5. That the social context of the experiment influences females, but not males proposer's behavior is clear.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the end of every experimental session, subjects were paid in cash according to their payoff in the game (plus a show-up fee of 2.5C =). 5 The time sequence of every experimental session was as follows: In the main entrance of the laboratory there were two boxes containing two series of numbers (odd numbers for men and even numbers for women), and subjects picked them randomly. 6 Subjects were individually asked to pick a piece of paper from their corresponding gender box, and to sit down in front of the computer displaying the number they had taken.…”

Section: General Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hoffman et al (1996) argue that a decrease in social distance could induce reciprocity. Bohnet and Frey (1999) allude to identification, not reciprocity when explaining giving behavior in a dictator game. In contrast, Hoffman et al (1999) consider that these two results are compatible, since identification and reciprocity are linked.…”

Section: The Analysis Of Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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'The Devil is in the Details' - Sex Differences in Simple Bargaining Games

Mejía

Miller

2007

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe study of gender differences in social preferences has shown mixed results, preventing economists and other social scientists from drawing definitive conclusions on this topic. Several original investigations and experimental reviews have hypothesized that the main reason of this heterogeneity of results is the myriad of experimental designs used to study gender differences. In this paper we test this hypothesis by making male and female participants to face two different but related experimental games and two different information treatments. Through this 2x2 factorial design, we obtain results in line with some recent papers: women are sensitive to the design and context of the experiment in ways that men are not. In addition, we go further providing a well-grounded account on the importance of the context for female decision-making.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: General Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Analysis Of Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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'The Devil is in the Details' - Sex Differences in Simple Bargaining Games

Mejía

Miller

2007

SSRN Journal

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“…However, despite group membership being known in these experiments, the concrete identity of the partner was still unknown to players. Some experiments further allowed face-to-face contact and communication before the experiment (Bochet et al, 2006;Bohnet and Frey, 1999), and these studies show that identifiability of the partner increases cooperation. Only a few studies explicitly investigate the social ties that participants had formed outside the laboratory (Reuben and van Winden, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation

2014

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ABSTRACT:In this paper we present results from an economic experiment with 100 co-habiting couples, to investigate behaviour in a prisoner's dilemma played by spouses. We compare defection behaviour within real couples to pairs of strangers. We observe that one out of four participants choose not to cooperate with their spouse. To understand why spouses might prefer defection, we use a novel allocation task to elicit the individual's trade-off between efficiency and equality within a couple. We further investigate the impact of socio-demographic and psychological characteristics of the couples. We find in particular that lack of preferences for joint income maximization; having children and being married lead to higher defection rates in the social dilemma.

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“…Emotions are important components of message composition, speech production and perception, and face-to-face communication. Personal communication in various forms is known to improve cooperation (Orbell et al, 1988;Bohnet and Frey, 1999;Ridings et al, 2002;Zheng et al, 2002;Buchan et al, 2006;Cason et al, 2012) by facilitating coordination, decreasing social distance, raising solidarity, and providing the cues of familiarity that are normally associated with trustworthy relationships. Smith (1759) wrote of the "fellow feeling" that can be generated, for example as a consequence of sharing in another's emotional state, and being part of the process of improving it.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predictable and Predictive Emotions: Explaining Cheap Signals and Trust Re-Extension

Schniter

Sheremeta

2014

SSRN Journal

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Despite normative predictions from economics and biology, unrelated strangers will often develop the trust necessary to reap gains from one-shot economic exchange opportunities. This appears to be especially true when declared intentions and emotions can be cheaply communicated. Perhaps even more puzzling to economists and biologists is the observation that anonymous and unrelated individuals, known to have breached trust, often make effective use of cheap signals, such as promises and apologies, to encourage trust re-extension. We used a pair of trust games with one-way communication and an emotion survey to investigate the role of emotions in regulating the propensity to message, apologize, re-extend trust, and demonstrate trustworthiness. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors, remedial strategies used by promise-breakers, their effects on behavior, and subsequent outcomes. We found that emotions triggered by interaction outcomes are predictable and also predict subsequent apology and trust re-extension. The role of emotions in behavioral regulation helps explain why messages are produced, when they can be trusted, and when trust will be re-extended.Keywords: emotion, cheap signal, promise, apology, trust game, reciprocity, experiment INTRODUCTIONIn this paper, we explore the role of positive emotions (pride, believability, appreciation, contentment, cheerfulness, happiness) and negative emotions (guilt, shame, anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration) in regulating cheap signaling, trust re-extension, and trustworthy behavior in the wake of a veiled trust-based interaction between strangers with no explicit indication of certain expectation for repeated interaction 1 . Interactions with 1 A number of other behavioral economic studies have also used veiled designs where interacting participants are unaware of opportunity for repeated interaction(s) that will later be made available (e.g., see Binmore et al., 1985;Burnham et al., 2000;Ellingsen et al., 2010;Gambetta and Székely, 2014). Ellingsen et al. (2010, p. 96) discuss why the veiled design avoiding deception by commission does not violate the non-deception norm in behavioral economic experiments and why withholding procedural information may serve to limit undesirable experimenter demand. Nevertheless, because there is no clear agreement among economists as to what kinds of deception are taboo (see survey results by Krawczyk, 2013 and discussion by Wilson, 2014), deception by omission remains a potential concern with our design. Veiled designs may create negative externality in that the next time participants return to the laboratory to participate in other studies, they may question whether they should anticipate unannounced tasks or interactions, unless the instructions explicitly exclude such a possibility (see also Davis and Holt, 1993, pp. 23-24;Wilson, 2014). It is unlikely that our design produced these externalities, however, as we followed the procedural norm for conducting...

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The Sound of Silence in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Games

Cited by 103 publications

References 4 publications

'The Devil is in the Details' - Sex Differences in Simple Bargaining Games

'The Devil is in the Details' - Sex Differences in Simple Bargaining Games

Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation

Predictable and Predictive Emotions: Explaining Cheap Signals and Trust Re-Extension

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