“…: no such objective borderlines exist. (Goldstein , 63)What is being claimed in this passage is not that we cannot make sense of vague predicates having extensions at all, but merely that we cannot make sense of vague predicates having extensions that are not relativized to particular agents and times. Just as it does make sense to ask for the point at which a particular agent at a particular time will snap if exposed to unrelenting noise at 80 decibels, it does make sense to ask for the borderline of the extension of any vague predicate ‘P’ relative to a particular agent at a particular time.…”
Section: Agent Relativismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For any time t and agent A there is a point in the series at which A would (be disposed to) switch from a ‘P'‐verdict to a non‐‘P'‐verdict, and according to agent relativism, that point marks a (non‐objective) borderline for ‘P’ relative to A and t (cf. Goldstein , 61–63). Since the switching point for a specific agent may shift over time, and since the switching point at a specific time may be different for different agents, the extension of any vague predicate ‘P’ may vary across agent and times, and should thus be relativized to particular agents and times; the extensions of ‘P’ are ‘subjective’ rather than ‘objective’.…”
Section: Agent Relativismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, Goldstein agrees with (standard) contextualists that vague predicates are agent relative, but he is bound to disagree with their claim that vagueness consists in a form of context sensitivity since he takes vagueness to remain even when all contextual factors are held fixed. He illustrates this point with a science fiction scenario in which a subject is presented, at time t 1 , with the first item in the Sorites series and, after the verdict has been passed “is transported back to t 1 when the subject's brain reconfigures to the exact state, b 1 , it was in at that time” (Goldstein , 61). This procedure is then repeated for each of the items in the series.…”
Section: Agent Relativismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Even on an agent‐relativist view, there will be significant overlaps between different agent/time‐relativized extensions of vague predicates, and when it comes to clear cases, the overlap will be complete, at least under optimal conditions (cf. Raffman , 67; Goldstein , 64). Consequently, there will be no variation in application of ‘P’ to clear cases across different runs of the forced‐march Sorites experiment (under optimal conditions), and thus there will be nothing about the forced‐march data that commits an objectivist to deny that ordinary speakers are perfectly classificatorily competent with respect to clear cases.…”
Section: Linguistic Competencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, perhaps we should also expect competent speakers to take vague predicates to be (in some sense) tolerant to sufficiently small changes along the relevant dimension of comparison, or to consider certain disagreements concerning non‐clear cases to be legitimate (cf. Eklund , 41; Goldstein , 63)) . However, from a neutral point of view, there seems to be no reason to take ordinary competence with vague predicates to require an ability to classify non‐clear cases in a semantically correct way, not even under optimal conditions.…”
Agent relativists about vagueness (henceforth ‘agent relativists’) hold that whether or not an object x falls in the extension of a vague predicate ‘P’ at a time t depends on the judgemental dispositions of a particular competent agent at t. My aim in this paper is to critically examine arguments that purport to support agent relativism by appealing to data from forced‐march Sorites experiments. The most simple and direct versions of such forced‐march Sorites arguments rest on the following (implicit) premise: If competent speakers' judgements vary in a certain way, then the extensions of ‘P’ as used by these speakers must vary in the same way. This premise is in need of independent support, since otherwise opponents of agent relativism can simply reject it. In this paper, I focus on the idea that one cannot plausibly reject this premise, as that would commit one to implausible claims about linguistic competence. Against this, I argue that one can accommodate the data from forced‐march Sorites experiments in a way that is compatible with a plausible picture of linguistic competence, without going agent relativist. Thus, there is reason to be sceptical of the idea that such data paired with considerations about linguistic competence can be invoked in order to lend any solid support to agent relativism. Forced‐march Sorites arguments of this kind can, and should be, resisted.
“…: no such objective borderlines exist. (Goldstein , 63)What is being claimed in this passage is not that we cannot make sense of vague predicates having extensions at all, but merely that we cannot make sense of vague predicates having extensions that are not relativized to particular agents and times. Just as it does make sense to ask for the point at which a particular agent at a particular time will snap if exposed to unrelenting noise at 80 decibels, it does make sense to ask for the borderline of the extension of any vague predicate ‘P’ relative to a particular agent at a particular time.…”
Section: Agent Relativismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For any time t and agent A there is a point in the series at which A would (be disposed to) switch from a ‘P'‐verdict to a non‐‘P'‐verdict, and according to agent relativism, that point marks a (non‐objective) borderline for ‘P’ relative to A and t (cf. Goldstein , 61–63). Since the switching point for a specific agent may shift over time, and since the switching point at a specific time may be different for different agents, the extension of any vague predicate ‘P’ may vary across agent and times, and should thus be relativized to particular agents and times; the extensions of ‘P’ are ‘subjective’ rather than ‘objective’.…”
Section: Agent Relativismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, Goldstein agrees with (standard) contextualists that vague predicates are agent relative, but he is bound to disagree with their claim that vagueness consists in a form of context sensitivity since he takes vagueness to remain even when all contextual factors are held fixed. He illustrates this point with a science fiction scenario in which a subject is presented, at time t 1 , with the first item in the Sorites series and, after the verdict has been passed “is transported back to t 1 when the subject's brain reconfigures to the exact state, b 1 , it was in at that time” (Goldstein , 61). This procedure is then repeated for each of the items in the series.…”
Section: Agent Relativismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Even on an agent‐relativist view, there will be significant overlaps between different agent/time‐relativized extensions of vague predicates, and when it comes to clear cases, the overlap will be complete, at least under optimal conditions (cf. Raffman , 67; Goldstein , 64). Consequently, there will be no variation in application of ‘P’ to clear cases across different runs of the forced‐march Sorites experiment (under optimal conditions), and thus there will be nothing about the forced‐march data that commits an objectivist to deny that ordinary speakers are perfectly classificatorily competent with respect to clear cases.…”
Section: Linguistic Competencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, perhaps we should also expect competent speakers to take vague predicates to be (in some sense) tolerant to sufficiently small changes along the relevant dimension of comparison, or to consider certain disagreements concerning non‐clear cases to be legitimate (cf. Eklund , 41; Goldstein , 63)) . However, from a neutral point of view, there seems to be no reason to take ordinary competence with vague predicates to require an ability to classify non‐clear cases in a semantically correct way, not even under optimal conditions.…”
Agent relativists about vagueness (henceforth ‘agent relativists’) hold that whether or not an object x falls in the extension of a vague predicate ‘P’ at a time t depends on the judgemental dispositions of a particular competent agent at t. My aim in this paper is to critically examine arguments that purport to support agent relativism by appealing to data from forced‐march Sorites experiments. The most simple and direct versions of such forced‐march Sorites arguments rest on the following (implicit) premise: If competent speakers' judgements vary in a certain way, then the extensions of ‘P’ as used by these speakers must vary in the same way. This premise is in need of independent support, since otherwise opponents of agent relativism can simply reject it. In this paper, I focus on the idea that one cannot plausibly reject this premise, as that would commit one to implausible claims about linguistic competence. Against this, I argue that one can accommodate the data from forced‐march Sorites experiments in a way that is compatible with a plausible picture of linguistic competence, without going agent relativist. Thus, there is reason to be sceptical of the idea that such data paired with considerations about linguistic competence can be invoked in order to lend any solid support to agent relativism. Forced‐march Sorites arguments of this kind can, and should be, resisted.
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