The Social Terrain of Rebel Held Territory

Abstract

The extent of local order varies widely in rebel held areas, from total chaos to well-run governing institutions. When these institutions exist, why do some include civilian input in local affairs, while others exclude civilians from governance? I argue that rebels choose different governing strategies that maximize their utility of territorial control, based on certain characteristics of civilian inhabitants populating the territory. Rebels’ constituency determines whether rebels seek to govern civilians or control them solely with coercive violence, and community cohesion (or lack thereof) then determines the type of institutions that rebels develop. I focus on three different outcomes for communities under rebel control—no institutions, exclusive institutions, and inclusive institutions. I test my argument using historical, statistical, and case evidence, leveraging original cross-national data on local order in rebel held territory as well as interviews with village heads, ex-combatants, and community members in Aceh, Indonesia.

The Effect of Wartime Legacies on Electoral Mobilization after Civil War

“…This fraction has the useful property that if the numerator is large and the denominator is small the resulting value for GAM support i becomes large. This scenario describes a district with high levels of battle violence and indiscriminate TNI violence against civilians, but little one-sided violence by the rebel group-which is precisely the pattern of violence we would see in areas with high GAM support (Breslawski 2020).…”

“…The distinct Acehnese identity of GAM led these non-Acehnese ethnic groups to support state forces which, in turn, were more restrained in their use of violence. As a consequence, GAM rebels relied more strongly on violence to enforce civilian support (Barter 2013;Breslawski 2020). In the run-up to these first post-conflict elections, the wartime allegiances and hostilities between civilians, GAM rebels, and government representatives appeared to be in flux.…”

The Effect of Wartime Legacies on Electoral Mobilization after Civil War

“…The distinct Acehnese identity of GAM led these non-Acehnese ethnic groups to support state forces which, in turn, were more restrained in their use of violence. As a consequence, GAM rebels relied more strongly on violence to enforce civilian support (Barter 2013;Breslawski 2021).…”

New Directions in Rebel Governance Research

“…Mampilly and Stewart (2021) suggest there are a number of ways rebels integrate civilians into governance structures, such as through local councils in rebel-held areas, that can ultimately constrain rebel behavior. Breslawski (2021) demonstrates that the inclusiveness of rebel institutions varies depending on the cohesion of the local community pre-conflict, and that rebels are willing to constrain their direct power when they see civilian goals as more aligned with their own. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer (2021) highlight the use of popular elections by rebels, an institution classically associated with increased accountability.…”