The Social Life of Pure Sociology

Abstract

pure sociology paradigm reveals his preference for studying the psychological properties of individuals, rather than developing a genuinely sociological framework for studying "social life." The current rejoinder concentrates on four main issues, starting with a discussion of the ontological status of social life as a reality sui generis. The second section deals with the scientific status of pure sociology and clarifies the underlying logic of the explanatory approach. The third part considers the scientific adequacy or validity of pure sociology. Where the intellectual stakes are highest-the theoretical validity of "pure sociology"-Marshall's critique falls flattest: the available evidence overwhelmingly supports the theoretical claims of pure sociologists. By the same token, Marshall fails to demonstrate the utility of psychologizing social life, or how the imputation of psychological variables enhances the explanatory power of purely sociological models. The paper then reveals the hypocrisy of particular aspects of Marshall's critique, as the evidence indicates that he has used some similar elements of theory construction for which he has criticized Black and the pure sociology framework. The conclusion reminds readers of the excitement of pure sociology's mission beyond the futility of irresolvable philosophical quibbles.In his critique of Donald Black's work and the "pure sociology" framework, Douglas Marshall (2008) raises issues that are primarily philosophical in nature and hence not amenable to scientific investigation. Paradigmatic preferences have long been debated and, in many instances, resolved among sociological practitioners accordingly: they largely ignore each other (if possible), pursue different lines of inquiry, and communicate mainly with others who share their assumptions. Marshall has opted for a different path. Rather than ignore the pure sociology paradigm, his comments are aimed at trying to discredit the perspective altogether. In a discipline that endorses an unbridled degree of intellectual pluralism (Michalski 2005a; Turner 2006a), one might imagine that the pursuit of the pure sociology program would be a source of inspiration or at least reassurance. For Marshall (2008), however, pure sociology poses real "dangers" by ignoring what he believes to be the key explanatory features of social life: "the psychological properties of . . . persons" (p. 230).The heart of Marshall's critique thus involves his insistence that satisfactory sociological explanations of social phenomena must include individuals qua individuals, or "people" in the traditional, psychological sense of the term. Armed with that essentialist claim, how does one advance the debate? It is probably impossible, for the scholars embrace irreconcilable ontological assumptions: Black (1995) starts from the premise that there exists a "social reality" distinct from "individual reality," discarding the notion that the individual serves as the key unit of analysis in his sociological theorizing. 1

Empirical indicators of mobilization of law

“…Споры между сторонниками и про тивниками подхода чистой социологии возникают и по прошествии лет, примером чего является дискуссия на страницах журнала «The Sociological Quarterly» в 2008 г. [Marshall, 2008;Michalski, 2008].…”

Scientific Partisanship: The Social Geometry of Intellectual Support

“…In the extreme, Turner () states flatly: “All of the theoretical claims made by Donald Black are false” (p. 237). Michalski's () review of the empirical evidence, of course, sharply contradicts that claim. Perhaps ironically, the gap between critics and supporters can be explained in part by drawing on pure sociology itself as an analytic framework.…”

The Behavior of Law: A Theoretical Integration

“…Most important, the scientific evidence evaluating Black's theory of law has been highly consistent with the general theory. For example, Michalski found that more than 70 percent of the research studies over three decades produced strong support for various aspects of the theory of law, while an additional 11% yielded at least mixed results [9]. The apparent weaknesses or empirical inconsistencies largely relate to one of two main reasons: 1) the failure to conceptualize social life in a manner consistent with the theory; and 2) the failure to measure the full range of relevant sociological dimensions outlined in the theory.…”