The social dilemma of bribery in emerging economies: A dynamic model of emotion, social value, and institutional uncertainty

Abstract

Corruption dampens social justice and can hurt consumer welfare through increases in transaction costs and perceived unfairness in resource distribution. This study examines the particular corruption practice of bribery. It conceptualizes bribery decisions in terms of social dilemmas, that is, the acquisition of valuable assets for personal good vs. maintaining a fair and open mechanism for the collective common good. To better understand this social dilemma, institutional uncertainty was incorporated to contextualize the decision situation. Combining both cognitive and emotional mechanisms, the proposed model deliberates the psychological process of the social dilemma, particularly the contradiction between social values and selfinterests as well as their influences on ethical emotions such as shame and fear. A double loop model is further proposed to elucidate the societal dynamics of bribery decisions, which suggests a solution to reduce the likelihood of the social dilemma by governing the social consequences of bribery, enhancing social value, decreasing the uncertainty level of institutions, and intensifying emotional inhibition, where managing the levels of institutional uncertainty center the dynamics.

The Bribery Paradox in Transition Economies and the Enactment of ‘New Normal’ Business Environments

“…(Clarke and Xu, ; Djankov et al, ; Doh et al, ; Misangyi et al, ). As open and fair mechanisms for distributing resources are hindered due to corruption, everyone in the community suffers because of the need to pay bribes for public services (Li et al, ). Although some scholars acknowledge that corruption can accrue certain benefits in transition economies by allowing entrepreneurs to bypass bureaucracy (Christensen et al, ; Olimpieva, , ) and get vital jobs done (Li et al, ), for the most part, corruption is viewed as a ‘willful perversion of order, ideals and perhaps most important, trust – a “moral deterioration”’ (Ashforth et al, , p. 671).…”

How powerful political ties appropriate resources and how weaker organizations protect themselves: A case study from Indonesia

“…It also requires interpretation within the Indonesian context, where networks linking politics with business are both resilient and adaptable, especially at the local level (Van Klinken & Aspinall, 2011: 140). In this study, we were interested in politically connected organizations, which is broader than just corruption (Li et al, 2015). We suggest that the untangling of political ties, organizational boundaries and corruption is another fruitful line of inquiry that could yield additional insights .…”

“…Yet, we also know that political ties can derail firm strategy in various ways (e.g., Fan et al, 2007;Siegel, 2007). They may expropriate funds (Fan et al, 2007), become involved in corporate governance (Okhmatovskiy, 2010), demand bribes (Li, Yao, & Ahlstrom, 2015;Shleifer & Vishny, 1994), interfere with management (Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Lui, 2000) or introduce diverging goals (Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010). Research finds that political ties are particularly salient in emerging economies (Faccio, 2006), where institutions may be weak and organizations substantially dependent on the government .…”

A neo-institutional perspective on ethical decision-making

“…The overwhelming presence of unethical values within the system, shaped by greed and corruption, seemed to be inculcating unethical behaviors (Chakraborty, 1997;Li et al, 2015).…”

“…Numerous executives believed that it was possible to shape individuals' ethical behavior. First, it was important to understand the root cause(s) of unethical behavior (Li et al, 2015). Next, behavioral modification strategies, either through counseling (or training) or selfdetermination, could be applied (Lange, 2008).…”