The social construction of an EU interest in counter-terrorism: US influence and internal struggles in the cases of PNR and SWIFT

Abstract

The construction of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has seen the pooling of a significant amount of national sovereignty at the European Union (EU) level through the establishment of internal EU competences. This process has also had the important side-effect of an increasing development of an EU interest in various areas of security, including in counter-terrorism. This article examines the processes through which the EU interest in counter-terrorism is constructed. It argues that, in line with social constructivist literature, it is important to conceptualise interests as being mutually constituted through interactions amongst political actors. It further develops two arguments in this respect. First, the United States (US) has exercised significant influence on the shaping of the EU interest in counter-terrorism. This point is particularly wellillustrated by the Passenger Name Record case. The second argument put forward by this article is that the process through which the EU interest is shaped has become increasingly complex, in particular following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which reinforced the powers of the European Parliament. A particularly apt illustration of this argument is the case of the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) Agreement.

Introduction: rethinking Western foreign policy and the Middle East

“…Monar et al (2003),Baldaccini et al (2007),Balzacq and Carrera (2006),Huysmans (2006),Guild and Geyer (2008), van Munste (2009) andBigo et al (2010).2 Zimmermann (2006),Spence (2007),Eckes (2009), Brown (2010,Bures (2006;), Argomaniz (2011), Kaunert (20052010a;2010b;2010c),Kaunert and Della Giovanna (2010),Kaunert and Léonard (2011),Léonard and Kaunert (2012),Kaunert et al (2012a),Bossong (2008; andMacKenzie et al (2013).3 Baldaccini(2007),Geddes (2008),Léonard (2009) andBoswell and Geddes (2011).4 Fletcher and Lö ö f (2008) andEckes and Konstadinides (2011).5 Anderson and Apap (2002),Occhipinti (2003) andGuild and Geyer (2008).6 Kaunert et al (2012b) andKaunert and Zwolski (2013).7 Balzacq(2009), Wolff et al (2009), Wolff (2009; 2012) and Trauner (2011).Introduction 499 Downloaded by [UQ Library] at 03:54 15 March 2015…”

The counterterrorism agreements of Europol with third countries: Data protection and power asymmetry

“…21 In relations based on interdependence, the powerful actors may cause or trigger an interest formation process in the weaker actors which have a greater need to initiate or sustain the cooperation; in this way, weaker actors may abandon their previous legislative and institutional priorities. 22 In such situations of asymmetric interdependence the actors which are more dependent on the cooperation with third states tend to compromise and to give concessions to these third states in order to secure the benefits gained from international cooperation. 23 Additionally, in the international relations literature power is often conceptualised as having two dimensions, namely "hard" power and "soft" power.…”

“…48 The security officials of the EU used the U.S. demands for enhanced transatlantic cooperation as an excuse for increasing the role and status of the Europol within the EU's security machinery. 49 This agreement was an opportunity for Europol to improve its intelligence network both internally and externally, given that many member states were reluctant to share critical information with Europol due to mistrust; 50 the Europol-U.S. agreement, however, paved the way for Europol to become a central body in EU's intelligence, counterterrorism and law enforcement apparatus.…”

US mainland, EU archipelago? Convergence and divergence on transnational organized crime

“…With the process of political integration deepening, and above all with the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament can co-legislate on matters of law enforcement cooperation, judicial cooperation, criminal justice cooperation and data protection. Moreover, its consent is required for concluding international agreements that cover fields to which the ordinary legislative procedure applies (Kaunert et al 2012).…”