2015
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12114
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The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships

Abstract: International audienceWe build on the existing literature in public-private partnerships (PPP) to analyze the main incentive issues in PPPs and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse firm chooses noncontractible efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We first consider the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and management stages into a single contract, allowing for different … Show more

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Cited by 242 publications
(159 citation statements)
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References 65 publications
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“…It has thus been common for governments to request in the contracts that private developers bear the additional cost that might arise from the execution of PPPs. Depending on the type of contract and infrastructure, there may also be incentives for the private partner to under-invest in construction to maximize net returns (Iossa and Martimort, 2015).…”
Section: Box 14 Unsolicited Proposals and Suboptimal Outcomes In Thmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It has thus been common for governments to request in the contracts that private developers bear the additional cost that might arise from the execution of PPPs. Depending on the type of contract and infrastructure, there may also be incentives for the private partner to under-invest in construction to maximize net returns (Iossa and Martimort, 2015).…”
Section: Box 14 Unsolicited Proposals and Suboptimal Outcomes In Thmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Public utilities projects are mostly long-term construction projects, huge investment in public welfare projects, which the government played an indispensable role. However, with the development of the society, the state finance is far from meeting the huge investment demand [1]. At the same time, the government has become a worldwide problem in the high investment, low efficiency and high consumption of resources in public utilities construction.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The optimal structure of procurement contracts between the public and private sector is studied by comparing PPP with traditional public procurement. A principalagent model based on Hart (2003) and Iossa and Martimort (2015) focuses on how bundling affects procurement and shows the advantages PPP has over traditional public procurement in this regard.…”
Section: Enhanced Efficiency and Fiscal Flexibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%