The simple economics of class action: private provision of club and public goods

Cassone, Alberto; Ramello, Giovanni B.

doi:10.1007/s10657-011-9254-7

Cited by 20 publications

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“…1 The number of articles published on the topic in the journal is quite extensive and, as written, at an increasing pace. For giving a insight of it we may cite here to a few of them since Tullock (1994) on court errors, Benson (1999) on the decision to arbitrate or to litigate, van Wijck and van Velthoven (2000) on American rule versus British rule in litigation, Fon et al (2005) on the impact on legal change, Schneider (2005) focusing on judges productivity, Cassone and Ramello (2011) on the economics of class action litigation and Calabresi and Schwartz (2011) on their cost, Di Vita (2012) on administrative disputes and Deybeli (2012) focusing on the technical efficiency of the European Judicial system. However for a more complete overview we must let the reader to conduct a more extensive exploration of the journal pages.…”

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Ramello

2017

Eur J Law Econ

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Ramello

2017

Eur J Law Econ

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“…Ulen 2011continues the discussion and understandings by giving the reader a comprehensive law and economics framework summarizing the theory and the practice of class action litigation in the U.S. His chapter sketches out at a general level the economics skeleton of this idiosyncratic legal device of the American legal procedure for making possible the assessment of efficiency, the focus of law and economics analysis Cassone and Ramello (2011) go further on this path of disentangling the economic rationale of class action, by considering it as a mere technology albeit ''legal''. The stylization thus permits to highlight the productive features in connection with attorneys', victims' and society's interests.…”

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The Law and Economics of Class Actions

2014

Research in Law and Economics

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More than four decades ago in The Logic of Collective Action, Olson (1965) provided the evidence that in specific circumstances the uncoordinated action of individuals can be less efficient than coordinated action. He was essentially targeting public goods. Nonetheless, this attitude sometimes extends to different goods even though a large number of individuals have a common interest. The Olson contribution was therefore a meaningful explanation for the formation of groups and, as a by-product, for the emergence of specific institutions devoted to making coordination possible. However, cooperation and organization can not only better serve the private interest of individuals but can be ''the most powerful tools human reason can employ'' for expressing human liberty (Von Hayek 1960, p. 37) in a wide number of settings, from the market to the political and government systems where other means are ineffective. An important question is thus whether the previous reasoning equally applies to the judiciary: certainly this is an important topic for law and economics research. Generally speaking, in a number of cases legal actions can be brought collectively and imply some coordination, such as for criminal lawsuits involving a number of victims or for litigations fostered by a public company, involving, albeit indirectly, all the investors. However, this only concerns limited situations.

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“…Ulen (2011) continues the discussion and understandings by giving the reader a comprehensive law and economics framework summarizing the theory and the practice of class action litigation in the U.S. His chapter sketches out at a general level the economics skeleton of this idiosyncratic legal device of the American legal procedure for making possible the assessment of efficiency, the focus of law and economics analysis Cassone and Ramello (2011) go further on this path of disentangling the economic rationale of class action, by considering it as a mere technology albeit ''legal''. The stylization thus permits to highlight the productive features in connection with attorneys', victims' and society's interests.…”

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confidence: 99%

The law and economics of class actions

2011

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More than four decades ago in The Logic of Collective Action, Olson (1965) provided the evidence that in specific circumstances the uncoordinated action of individuals can be less efficient than coordinated action. He was essentially targeting public goods. Nonetheless, this attitude sometimes extends to different goods even though a large number of individuals have a common interest. The Olson contribution was therefore a meaningful explanation for the formation of groups and, as a by-product, for the emergence of specific institutions devoted to making coordination possible.However, co-operation and organization can not only better serve the private interest of individuals but can be ''the most powerful tools human reason can employ'' for expressing human liberty (Von Hayek 1960, p. 37) in a wide number of settings, from the market to the political and government systems where other means are ineffective.An important question is thus whether the previous reasoning equally applies to the judiciary: certainly this is an important topic for law and economics research. Generally speaking, in a number of cases legal actions can be brought collectively and imply some coordination, such as for criminal lawsuits involving a number of victims or for litigations fostered by a public company, involving, albeit indirectly, all the investors. However, this only concerns limited situations.

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The simple economics of class action: private provision of club and public goods

Abstract: Class action, Collective litigation, Mass tort, Club, Liability, Deterrence, K41, D71, D74, K13, H41,

Cited by 20 publications

References 25 publications

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The Law and Economics of Class Actions

The law and economics of class actions

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