2018
DOI: 10.1017/9781316831809
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The Significance of the New Logic

Abstract: W. V. Quine was one of the most influential figures of twentieth-century American analytic philosophy. Although he wrote predominantly in English, in Brazil in 1942 he gave a series of lectures on logic and its philosophy in Portuguese, subsequently published as the book O Sentido da Nova Lógica. The book has never before been fully translated into English, and this volume is the first to make its content accessible to Anglophone philosophers. Quine would go on to develop revolutionary ideas about semantic hol… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The radical extensionalist logicians of the 1930s and 1940s, especially Tarski and Quine, thought logic should only account for differences in extension, not intension: as Tarski put it, 'two concepts with different intensions but identical extensions are logically indistinguishable' (Tarski, 1956(Tarski, [1935: 387). Quine, too, enthusiastically defended extensionalism (Quine, 2018(Quine, [1944: 158; see also Janssen-Lauret, 2018, 2022b, and it was assumed that modal logics like C. I. Lewis's couldn't be extended to the quantified case until Ruth Barcan managed it in 1946-7 (Barcan, 1946(Barcan, , 1947.…”
Section: Stebbing's Views On Logicmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The radical extensionalist logicians of the 1930s and 1940s, especially Tarski and Quine, thought logic should only account for differences in extension, not intension: as Tarski put it, 'two concepts with different intensions but identical extensions are logically indistinguishable' (Tarski, 1956(Tarski, [1935: 387). Quine, too, enthusiastically defended extensionalism (Quine, 2018(Quine, [1944: 158; see also Janssen-Lauret, 2018, 2022b, and it was assumed that modal logics like C. I. Lewis's couldn't be extended to the quantified case until Ruth Barcan managed it in 1946-7 (Barcan, 1946(Barcan, , 1947.…”
Section: Stebbing's Views On Logicmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(The sharp boundary between classical logic and mathematics, in particular set theory, is something Quine draws only in some of his later works, such as Philosophy of Logic . Oftentimes Quine (, p. 1944) does consider ways of drawing a line but leaves “this terminological question undecided” (p. 112) or he says that “one might well limit the word ‘logic’ to the former (though I shall not)” (Quine, , p. 111).)…”
Section: The Role Of Classical Logic In Quine's Criterionmentioning
confidence: 99%