“…The radical extensionalist logicians of the 1930s and 1940s, especially Tarski and Quine, thought logic should only account for differences in extension, not intension: as Tarski put it, 'two concepts with different intensions but identical extensions are logically indistinguishable' (Tarski, 1956(Tarski, [1935: 387). Quine, too, enthusiastically defended extensionalism (Quine, 2018(Quine, [1944: 158; see also Janssen-Lauret, 2018, 2022b, and it was assumed that modal logics like C. I. Lewis's couldn't be extended to the quantified case until Ruth Barcan managed it in 1946-7 (Barcan, 1946(Barcan, , 1947.…”