The Signaling Mechanism of Fairness Concern in E-CLSC

Abstract

The E-CLSC (E-closed-loop supply chain) game model dominated by manufacturer is set, and information value about asymmetry fairness concern of E-platform (E-commerce platform) is calculated for manufacturer, recycler, and E-platform. By signaling model under various signal costs, the authors study the condition for E-platform to transmit real information about fairness concern so as to reduce profit loss for all parties in E-CLSC. The authors prove that E-platform has the motivation to disguise or exaggerate fairness concerns in order to obtain more profit, and manufacturers must try to identify the E-platform's real fairness concern to avoid profit loss. Besides, only when different types of E-platforms need significantly different signaling cost, both of them would like to send real fairness-concern signal, and thus manufacturer can effectively identify E-platform's real information about fairness concern so as to improve recycling rate and optimize the whole E-CLSC operation.

Design and Evaluation of Packaging Art Based on Sentimental Value Calculation and Clustering

“…Enterprises increasingly adopt the production model of multiple varieties and small batches as the primary mode of operation. Simultaneously, consumer preferences have become more diversified and individualized, with market segmentation emerging as a requisite survival strategy for enterprises (Qin et al, 2023;Wang et al, 2023;Meng et al, 2023). Notably, while there is considerable quantitative research on packaging design from a management and marketing perspective (Ketelsen et al, 2020), theoretical studies abound on the concept, connotation, and outlook of precise packaging design; however, practical investigations into specific application technologies, methods, and tools are sparse (Anukiruthika, 2020).…”