The signaling function of sharing fake stories

Abstract

Why do people share or publicly engage with fake stories? Two possible answers come to mind: (a) people are deeply irrational and believe these stories to be true; or (b) they intend to deceive their audience. Both answers presuppose the idea that people put the stories forward as true. But I argue that in some cases, these outlandish (yet also very popular) stories function as signals of one's group membership. This signaling function can make better sense of why, despite their unusual nature or lack of a factual basis, some of these stories are so widespread.

Rational reasons for irrational beliefs.

“…The readiness with which group members adopt and propagate falsehoods may thus be useful gauges of group loyalty; indeed, individuals who fail such tests (fail to share falsehoods shared by group members) are sanctioned by their group members (Lawson et al, 2023). Thus, as Bergamaschi Ganapini (2023) suggested, leaders can strategically propagate falsehoods to test their followers, and followers can reaffirm their loyalty to these leaders and to the groups by repeating these falsehoods.…”

“…Several features of falsehoods make them particularly well designed as signals of commitment (Bergamaschi Ganapini, 2023; Funkhouser, 2022; Kahan, 2013; Kurzban & Christner, 2011; Petersen et al, 2021; Tooby, 2017; D. Williams, 2022b).…”

Symbolic belief in social cognition

“…Whether consciously or unconsciously, these expressions of symbolic belief (and, perhaps, the symbolic beliefs themselves) are often shaped by the incentive to be viewed as a desirable cooperative partner (Funkhouser, 2022a;Williams, 2021). These incentives can explain why many avidly expressed beliefs appear absurd, irrational, or downright dangerous to outgroup members (Bergamaschi Ganapini, 2023;Funkhouser, 2022b;Williams, 2022a): the true function of these actions is not to express what one takes to be the literal truth, but to signal one's social identity and maintain one's status within the ingroup. The active role of the target in manipulating the mindreader's behavior and mental states indicates that the folk psychology of symbolic belief also has a strong regulative or mindshaping component (Andrews, 2015;McGeer, 2007;McGeer, 2021;Zawidzki, 2013).…”

“Trust Me, I’m a Scientist”

“…Furthermore, recent developments in philosophy and psychology suggest that people and the groups they associate with often hold misbeliefs when these serve certain social purposes, especially when errors are associated with low costs (e.g. Bergamaschi Ganapini, 2021;Funkhouser, 2017;Mercier, 2020;Williams, 2020). Williams (2020) has called them "socially adaptive beliefs".…”