The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action

Grynszpan, Ouriel; Sahaï, Aïsha; Hamidi, Nasmeh; Pacherie, Élisabeth; Berberian, Bruno; Roche, Lucas; Saint-Bauzel, Ludovic

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.102820

Cited by 31 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…When interacting with nonhuman agents (or robots), it has been found that implicit Social Agency enhancements disappear (Grynszpan et al, 2019;Obhi & Hall, 2011b;Sahaï et al, 2019). Participants also judge their own contribution to joint action as greater when interacting with a robot (Grynszpan et al, 2019). Taken jointly, these findings may seem to suggest that we do not recognize the agentic status of an artificial other, but it is not that simple.…”

Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Low-level, sensorimotor processes inform our prereflective feeling of agency (Balconi, 2010;Metcalfe & Greene, 2007). This is debatably correlated (Imaizumi & Tanno, 2019) to, only weakly correlated (Moore, Middleton, Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012) to, or even dissociated (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014;Grynszpan et al, 2019;Obhi & Hall, 2011a;Saito, Takahata, Murai, & Takahashi, 2015) from our judgement of agency, which is a higher-level and reflective process operating through belief-like propositions (Balconi, 2010). An additional, uniquely social, aspect is an evaluative component to this higher level of Sense of Agency, where a sense of moral responsibility causes the evaluation of actions against sociocultural norms (Balconi, 2010;Montague & Lohrenz, 2007).…”

Section: What Is Social Agency?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Interestingly, it appears that 'we' agency is not established when performing joint action with a robotic partner (Grynszpan et al, 2019). This is part of the wider discussion into whether Social Agency effects are human centric and so will be elaborated on in the section titled Social Agency With Artificial Agents.…”

Section: 'We' Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The difference in Sense of Agency between human-human and human-computer interaction has been overtly measured in joint-action paradigms (Grynszpan et al, 2019;Obhi & Hall, 2011b;Sahaï, Desantis, Grynszpan, Pacherie, & Berberian, 2019). In a task where outcome attribution was ambiguous between partners, it was demonstrated that interacting with a computer partner failed to induce Temporal Binding effects or explicit agency attributions like those found when interacting with a conspecific; 'we' agency can only be induced by human-human interaction (Obhi & Hall, 2011b).…”

Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Crucially, the enhancement in Sense of Agency we experience from 'we' and shared agency appears to be something we only experience when interacting with other humans. When interacting with nonhuman agents (or robots), it has been found that implicit Social Agency enhancements disappear (Grynszpan et al, 2019;Obhi & Hall, 2011b;Sahaï et al, 2019). Participants also judge their own contribution to joint action as greater when interacting with a robot (Grynszpan et al, 2019).…”

Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social Agency as a continuum

et al. 2020

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Sense of Agency, the phenomenology associated with causing one’s own actions and corresponding effects, is a cornerstone of human experience. Social Agency can be defined as the Sense of Agency experienced in any situation in which the effects of our actions are related to a conspecific. This can be implemented as the other’s reactions being caused by our action, joint action modulating our Sense of Agency, or the other’s mere social presence influencing our Sense of Agency. It is currently an open question how such Social Agency can be conceptualized and how it relates to its nonsocial variant. This is because, compared with nonsocial Sense of Agency, the concept of Social Agency has remained oversimplified and underresearched, with disparate empirical paradigms yielding divergent results. Reviewing the empirical evidence and the commonalities and differences between different instantiations of Social Agency, we propose that Social Agency can be conceptualized as a continuum, in which the degree of cooperation is the key dimension that determines our Sense of Agency, and how it relates to nonsocial Sense of Agency. Taking this perspective, we review how the different factors that typically influence Sense of Agency affect Social Agency, and in the process highlight outstanding empirical questions within the field. Finally, concepts from wider research areas are discussed in relation to the ecological validity of Social Agency paradigms, and we provide recommendations for future methodology.

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Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: What Is Social Agency?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: 'We' Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social Agency as a continuum

et al. 2020

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Interacting with Machines: Can an Artificially Intelligent Agent Be a Partner?

Schmidt,

Loidolt

2023

Philos. Technol.

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In the past decade, the fields of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) have seen unprecedented developments that raise human-machine interactions (HMI) to the next level. Smart machines, i.e., machines endowed with artificially intelligent systems, have lost their character as mere instruments. This, at least, seems to be the case if one considers how humans experience their interactions with them. Smart machines are construed to serve complex functions involving increasing degrees of freedom, and they generate solutions not fully anticipated by humans. Consequently, their performances show a touch of action and even autonomy. HMI is therefore often described as a sort of “cooperation” rather than as a mere application of a tool. Some authors even go as far as subsuming cooperation with smart machines under the label of partnership, akin to cooperation between human agents sharing a common goal. In this paper, we explore how far the notion of shared agency and partnership can take us in our understanding of human interaction with smart machines. Discussing different topoi related to partnerships in general, we suggest that different kinds of “partnership” depending on the form of interaction between agents need to be kept apart. Building upon these discussions, we propose a tentative taxonomy of different kinds of HMI distinguishing coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and social partnership.

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