The ‘Selfish Element’: How Sperm and Egg Donors Construct Plausibly Moral Accounts of the Decision to Donate

Abstract

Multiple sociological studies have demonstrated how talk of ‘good’ motives enables people to maintain the presentation of a moral self in the context of stigmatised behaviours. Far fewer have examined why people sometimes describe acting for the ‘wrong reasons’ or choose to qualify, or reject, assumptions that they are motivated by a desire to ‘do good’. In this article, I analyse one such situation: sperm donors who describe being partially motivated by a ‘selfish’ desire to procreate, a motive which these same men frame as morally questionable. I argue that such accounts are explicable if we consider the (gendered) interactional and cultural contexts in which they are produced, particularly the way interactive contexts shape the desirability and achievability of plausibility and authenticity. I suggest that analysis of similar social phenomena can support sociologists in better understanding the complex ways in which moral practices are woven into social interactions.

Biohacking COVID-19: Sharing Is Not Always Caring

“…Motivations for acting—or sharing—can be seen as social acts, and not necessarily as a direct expression of some inner psychological state (Mills 1940). In different situations, people rely on specific words, expressions, and statements that are socially accepted to explain, justify, and make sense of their motivations and behaviors (Gilman 2021). On social media, accounts of what, how, and why to conduct biohacking to tackle COVID-19 can be understood as linguistic cues of biohackers’ motivations.…”

Embodied sociotechnical imaginaries: how donor-conceived people imagine identity, family and reprodigital futures beyond regulation

“…The third theme developed through our analysis related to participants' views about the practice of donor conception. Previous scholarship with donor conception studies has considered gamete donors' motivation talk and how donors "do morality" in such interactions (58,59). Just as donors used moral discourses and positionings, donor-conceived people also reflected on the moralities of the practice of donor conception.…”