The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions

Takeyh, Ray; Maloney, Suzanne

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01037.x

Cited by 32 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…15 Within the GECF, a gas "troika" was formed comprising Russia, Iran and Qatar. 20 The observations of Takeyh and Maloney are not without justification. The troika has been pushing for "more Yergin's observations are backed by the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA), which announced recently that natural gas is poised to enter a "golden age."…”

Section: A "Golden Age" Of Natural Gasmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Iran, Natural Gas and Asia's Energy Needs: A Spoiler for Sanctions?

Carter

2014

Middle East Policy

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Section: A "Golden Age" Of Natural Gasmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…95 For Takeyh and Maloney, then, economic sanctions are "a tool whose efficacy progressively declines." Ray Takeyh and Suzanne Maloney, for example, believe that sanctions serve to bolster the regime's "siege mentality," which actually strengthens its intransigence and resolve.…”

Section: The Problem Of Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Iran, Natural Gas and Asia's Energy Needs: A Spoiler for Sanctions?

Carter

2014

Middle East Policy

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“…Selain itu, terdapat beberapa faktor eksternal yang juga dapat menghambat efektivitas sanksi AS seperti perilaku mitra dagang utama Iran dalam menanggapi sanksi AS, kesiapan kawan-kawan AS untuk menegakkan sanksi AS atau memberlakukan sanksinya sendiri terhadap Iran, serta adanya negara-negara yang memainkan peran 'black knights' (Kozhanov, 2011). Sedangkan faktor domestik di Iran seperti ideologi dan doktrin rezim (Takeyh & Maloney, 2011;Majidpour, 2013), struktur kekuatan politik domestik (Borszik, 2015), serta perkembangan teknologi (Majidpour, 2013), juga masih menjadi kendala utama yang dihadapi oleh AS dalam menerapkan sanksi terhadap Iran.…”

Section: Pendahuluanunclassified

Post JCPOA

Rahim¹

2019

Jurnal ICMES

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This paper analyzes the effectiveness of U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy towards Iran carried out through the (re)implementation of sanctions regime after its withdrawal from the so called multilateral agreement ‘JCPOA’ on 8 May 2018. Unsatisfied with the terms of the Agreement, the U.S. administration decided to pull out from the Agreement and immediately implemented sanctions regime against Tehran. Despite the significance of previous studies regarding U.S.’ implementation of sanctions against Iran, I did not found any study that used a specific theory to indicate factors or conditions favoring the success of U.S. sanctions against Iran. In particular, I did not found any literature that analyzes the effectiveness U.S.’ sanctions against Iran after its withdrawal from JCPOA using a specific theory. This paper will fill that gap in the literature by examining the case study using a theory-driven research. The Analytical framework that I apply in this paper is coercive diplomacy theory developed by Tom Sauer which I elaborate into five main variables: objective, demand, threat, time-pressure, and motivation. By examining those factors, this paper argues that U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy against Iran has been ineffective because of the lack of U.S.’ calculation and considerations to the five variables.This paper analyzes the effectiveness of U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy towards Iran carried out through the (re)implementation of sanctions regime after its withdrawal from the so called multilateral agreement ‘JCPOA’ on 8 May 2018. Unsatisfied with the terms of the Agreement, the U.S. administration decided to pull out from the Agreement and immediately implemented sanctions regime against Tehran. Despite the significance of previous studies regarding U.S.’ implementation of sanctions against Iran, I did not found any study that used a specific theory to indicate factors or conditions favoring the success of U.S. sanctions against Iran. In particular, I did not found any literature that analyzes the effectiveness U.S.’ sanctions against Iran after its withdrawal from JCPOA using a specific theory. This paper will fill that gap in the literature by examining the case study using a theory-driven research. The Analytical framework that I apply in this paper is coercive diplomacy theory developed by Tom Sauer which I elaborate into five main variables: objective, demand, threat, time-pressure, and motivation. By examining those factors, this paper argues that U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy against Iran has been ineffective because of the lack of U.S.’ calculation and considerations to the five variables.

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“…97 There is also evidence that Iran has provided direct payments to the been one which seeks to isolate the Islamic Republic though punitive diplomatic, trade, technological, and financial sanctions as motivation to change its behavior. 107 This basic framework of carrot and stick diplomacy has been employed by every administration in the past thirty-two years without generating any notable change in Iran's behavior. 108 The U.S. National Security Strategy, published by the Obama administration in May 2010, goes so far as to suggest that not only has U.S. policy failed, but that Iran has become even more threatening as a result of past policy.…”

Section: The Iranian Constitution and Islamic Economic Principlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Middle East Stability and the Economic Ambitions of Iran

Leyh¹

2012

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The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions

Cited by 32 publications

References 0 publications

Iran, Natural Gas and Asia's Energy Needs: A Spoiler for Sanctions?

Iran, Natural Gas and Asia's Energy Needs: A Spoiler for Sanctions?

Post JCPOA

Middle East Stability and the Economic Ambitions of Iran

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