The self and conscious experience

Abstract

The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation—engendered by attentional activity—of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent’s own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S.

Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective

“…What follows is more general, in addressing questions that could potentially apply to any theory of consciousness requiring a learning process for the acquisition of agency by the individual. This accords with a more general (i.e., theory-independent) stance taken by some in the field, that consciousness (conscious agency in this formulation) must be learned ( Cleeremans, 2011 ; Cleeremans et al, 2020 ; see also Jablonka and Ginsburg, 2022 ), or similarly, for theories where consciousness depends on the emergence of a self, that selfhood (agency implied) must be learned and achieved ( Marchetti, 2022 , 2024 ). Here I am not so much concerned with consciousness per se , but with conscious agency which, from my analysis is separable from other problematic issues relating to consciousness, including the hard problem and the nature of phenomenal experience ( Lacalli, 2023 ), and requires a real-time interactive component for agency to reside fully with the individual.…”

“…Or vice versa. An early origin for both CCRs and DCs would also imply a long period of coevolution, which complicates the task of disentangling the respective contributions each makes to behavior, and to the development of a self, if indeed that is a precondition for DC-level consciousness [e.g., see Marchetti (2024) ]. The difficulty of interpreting experiments like Libet’s ( David et al, 2008 ; Neafsey, 2021 ; Triggiani et al, 2023 ) is not then surprising.…”

The DIKWP (Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom, Purpose) Revolution: A New Horizon in Medical Dispute Resolution

“…Consciousness is our ability to perceive our inner thoughts and the external world, enabling us to understand and interpret our experiences while also recognizing the existence and state of others [26,27]. Cognitive abilities, including understanding, memory, problem-solving, and decision-making, form the basis for processing information, forming opinions, and responding [28,29]. Together, these constitute the framework of human communication, allowing us to understand each other's intentions, emotions, and information, thereby effectively exchanging thoughts, feelings, and knowledge [30,31].…”