The Securitization and De-Securitization of Kurdish Societal Security in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, And Syria

Abstract

The four countries hosting Kurdish populations in the Middle East have mainly been politically centralized in character and sought to follow a homogeneous nation-state model through the assimilation of their Kurdish communities. Drawing on the concepts of societal security, securitization, and de-securitization derived from the theories of the Copenhagen School, this article examines Kurdish (in)security in the Middle East and argues that the Kurds have experienced significant societal insecurity due to the adoption of assimilation strategies by their host states. I posit that federalism and power sharing are the two obvious de-securitization strategies that may address the securitization of Kurdish identity in the states with significant Kurdish populations. I further argue that, while the federal model has appeared to manage securitized Kurdish identity in Iraq since 2003, this solution may not be applicable to Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Alternatively, consociational power sharing as a form of institutional de-securitization carries the potential to address Kurdish identity in these countries.

Navigating decolonization: Kurdish society, politics, and academic empowerment

“…1 For more information about the project see: https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/projects/Building-Research-and-Publication-Capacity-of-Emerging-Scholars-in-the-Kurdistan-Region-of-Iraq/. 2 See Hama (2020).…”

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