The Second Time as Farce? The EU Takeover Directive, the Clash of Capitalisms and the Hamstrung Harmonization of European (and French) Corporate Governance*

“…In contrast, other studies have identified negative effects resulting from a state's disagreement on implementation (Di Lucia/Kronsell 2010;Clift 2009). Milio (2010, 8-11) provides evidence that greater challenges in administration and increased costs are more willingly accepted as necessary side-effects when there is the political will to comply with EU law than when the proposed innovations are perceived as 'imposed' by the EU.…”

Section: Europeanisation and Implementationmentioning

confidence: 64%

Member states’ opposition in the Council of the European Union and its impacts on the implementation of directives

Pircher

2017

ozp

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the Council of the European Union (EU), a qualified majority is mostly required to adopt legislative acts. Based on this majority rule, individual member states can be outvoted and are subsequently obliged to implement the law. This article analyses whether opposition in the Council of the EU affects the transposition of directives into national law by using the example of Austria from 2000 to 2008. The results demonstrate that domestic factors, rather than a negative political attitude, were responsible for delays and procedures when implementing previously contested directives. However, the effects of opposition in the Council on implementation were particularly apparent in cases where there was a high degree of misfit between EU provisions and the domestic legal structure. Keywords SchlüsselwörterEuropäische Union, Rat der EU, oppositionelles Wahlverhalten, Österreich, Implementation von Richtlinien, rechtlicher Misfit Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincere thanks to all the interview partners for their time and the information they provided. This article presents the findings of a dissertation project conducted at the University of Vienna. I am grateful to my supervisor, Gerda Falkner, and my two reviewers and examiners, Heinrich Neisser and Andrea Lenschow, for their valuable comments and reviews in the process of completing the project. I would also like to thank the former members of the Institute for European Integration Research for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

show abstract

“…German policy-makers felt that domestic companies would be left in a position of asymmetric vulnerability since deviations from the one share-one vote principle had been eliminated in Germany, but not in many other EU member states (Clift, 2009;Hoepner, 2007).…”

Section: The Market For Corporate Control In German Bankingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protection of domestic bank ownership in France and Germany: The functional equivalency of institutional diversity in takeovers

Goyer

Real

2014

Review of International Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We investigate in this article the character of the market for corporate control (i.e. takeovers) in French and German banking. Its key feature is the marked ability of French and German banks to resist unsolicited takeover bids especially, although not exclusively, those from foreign competitors. We present an institutional perspective to account for the restrained character of takeovers in French and German banking. Our perspective is composed of two elements. First, institutional arrangements are important since they structure power relations among firm stakeholders by providing opportunities, as well as imposing constraints, to influence the decision-making process in which takeover transactions take place. Second, institutional arrangements provide firm stakeholders with several, not just one, potential opportunities to block unsolicited bids since takeover contests are composed of sequences of decisions for which approval is needed at each stage. French and German banks have used different mixes of institutional arrangements, themselves located at different stages of takeover transactions, to secure restrained markets for corporate control. Our institutional analysis, in turn, also illustrates an important shortcoming of banking sector protectionism, namely the contribution of protection from unsolicited takeover bids to the building of banks carrying systemic risks.

show abstract

The Second Time as Farce? The EU Takeover Directive, the Clash of Capitalisms and the Hamstrung Harmonization of European (and French) Corporate Governance*

Cited by 33 publications

References 36 publications

State Ownership and Corporate Governance

State Ownership and Corporate Governance

Member states’ opposition in the Council of the European Union and its impacts on the implementation of directives

Protection of domestic bank ownership in France and Germany: The functional equivalency of institutional diversity in takeovers

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About