The Second Amendment: A Dialogue

Kates, Don B.

doi:10.2307/1191614

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…They also present gender as “a powerful theoretical lens” with which to interrogate the Second Amendment. 45 Of the three chronological governance strategies the authors explore, “fixed governance” coincides with the contemporary spread of SYG laws, in which guns are perceived as essential for self-defense. 46 The studies under review indicate that there are important ways that the justice system disadvantages women — especially women of color and low-income women — who invoke SYG laws, and especially in the context of IPV and DV.…”

Section: Legal Limitations Of An Equitable Right To Self-defensementioning

confidence: 99%

Gender and Stand Your Ground Laws: A Critical Appraisal of Existing Research

Light

Thomas²,

Yakubovich

2023

J. Law. Med. Ethics

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Section: Legal Limitations Of An Equitable Right To Self-defensementioning

confidence: 99%

Gender and Stand Your Ground Laws: A Critical Appraisal of Existing Research

Light

Thomas²,

Yakubovich

2023

J. Law. Med. Ethics

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“…177 Professor Kates addressed the issue more directly in his 1986 article, The Second Amendment: A Dialogue. 178 Addressing to whom the right to arms extends, Professor Kates noted that "[f ]ree and republican institutions were believed to be dependent upon civic virtu which, in turn, depended upon each citizen being armed-and, therefore, fearless, self-reliant, and upright." 179 Professor Kates thus concluded that, "[o]ne implication of this emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e., criminals) or those who, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed incapable of virtue."…”

Section: A Lack Of Historical Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Historical Justification For Prohibiting Dangerous Persons From Possessing Arms

Greenlee

2019

SSRN Journal

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possession of firearms by felons. .. ." 1 The Heller Court did not elaborate on why such laws were presumptively lawful, instead promising to provide a "historical justification" for such laws when a better opportunity arises. 2 Two years later, the Court again referenced these presumptively lawful regulations in McDonald v. City of Chicago, but did not use the opportunity to elaborate on the historical basis for the regulations. 3 Thus far-over a decade since the Heller decision-the Court has not yet provided that historical justification. In the meantime, lower courts have been inundated with challenges to these presumptively lawful measures. The federal law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms has been the most challenged law under the Second Amendment post-Heller. 4 This Article surveys English and American history to discover what historical justification the Supreme Court was referring to. Part II examines what the Supreme Court has said about firearm prohibitions on felons. Section A explains why felon bans are presumptively lawful, Section B explains why the presumption of lawfulness is rebuttable, and Section C explains why any prohibition on felons must be rooted in history and tradition. Part III explores the history of laws prohibiting categories of people from possessing arms. Section A explores disarmament efforts throughout England's history. England had a long tradition of disarming dangerous persons, especially those disloyal to the government. Section B surveys laws from colonial America. Consistent with English tradition, colonial disarmament efforts focused on those perceived as posing a dangerous threat, including Loyalists to the British Crown, slaves, freedmen, and Native Americans. Section C summarizes the proposals from the ratifying conventions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. All three proposals are most reasonably read as allowing only dangerous persons to be disarmed. Section D provides examples of when prohibited persons could have their arms rights restored in the founding era. Unlike the lifetime bans that typically apply today, prohibited persons in the founding era could often regain their rights once they were no longer perceived as dangerous. Section E focuses on the nineteenth century, in which slaves, freedmen, and tramps were regulated most severely. Section F surveys the increasingly prevalent prohibitions in the twentieth century. The majority of these applied to noncitizens and are examined in Section F.1. The others applied to violent criminals and are examined in Section F.2.

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Citizen Gun Ownership and Criminal Deterrence: Theory, Research, and Policy*

Green

1987

Criminology

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Research on the general and specific deterrents emanating from citizenowned firearms is examined under assumptions about deterrence. Only slight and indirect empirical evidence for deterrence exists in the area of citizen gun ownership. The crime‐reducing effects associated with public policies that support civilian gun ownership are balanced in light of other, negative public health factors associated with citizen‐owned guns.

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The Second Amendment: A Dialogue

Cited by 5 publications

References 2 publications

Gender and Stand Your Ground Laws: A Critical Appraisal of Existing Research

Gender and Stand Your Ground Laws: A Critical Appraisal of Existing Research

The Historical Justification For Prohibiting Dangerous Persons From Possessing Arms

Citizen Gun Ownership and Criminal Deterrence: Theory, Research, and Policy*

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