The scope of exclusionary public response to the European refugee crisis

Abstract

We know from previous research that an exclusionary reaction in public opinion is likely following a sudden and large-scale influx of refugees of the sort experienced in many European countries in 2015. Yet, we know much less about the scope of these expected reactions. This article makes a conceptual and empirical contribution to the analysis of the scope of exclusionary reactions following a refugee crisis. Conceptually, we distinguish between three scope dimensions: substantive reach, duration and politicization. Empirically, we evaluate each of the scope dimensions using seven-wave panel-data collected before, during and after the large-scale influx of refugees to Norway. We find that the expected exclusionary reaction (a) spilled over to opinion about immigration broadly speaking; (b) endured in that it lasted long after the situation in Norway had been brought under control; (c) encompassed voters of all political stripes. Nevertheless, we also document an important limitation to the scope of the reaction: The sudden influx of refugees to Norway did not cause a permanent shift in public opinion. Approximately two years after the situation had been brought under control, opinion about both refugee rights and immigration generally had reverted back to pre-crisis baseline levels. Interestingly, the conceptual and empirical analysis suggests that public opinion dynamics following a sudden and large-scale influx of refugees is similar to that found in response to other forms of large national or international crises.

Interactions between migrant race and social status in predicting acceptance of climate migrants in Norway

“…Other research shows that acceptability of climate migrants is related to the expected number of migrants coming to the country (Helbling 2020). The broad acceptance we observed is likely to be (temporarily) reduced in the event of sudden influxes of large groups of climate migrants, similar to the changes observed over the 2015 refugee crisis (Nordø and Ivarsflaten 2022). That said, other research focusing on the 2015 refugee crisis show that public opinion on migrants is impacted by government rhetoric and policy (Gaucher et al 2018).…”

Scapegoating Immigrants in Times of Personal and Collective Crises: Results from a Czech Panel Study

“…As our analysis begins at the tail end of the 2015-2016 migration crisis in Europe, we cannot know for sure its impact on scapegoating and anti-immigrant sentiment. However, the pattern we observe does not preclude the possibility that this decrease follows a spike in antiimmigrant sentiment, as found in longer panel studies from Norway (Nordø and Ivarsflaten 2022;Velásquez and Eger, 2022). Further, we did not find evidence that the initial COVID-19-related lockdown was related to a surge in anti-immigrant attitudes in May and June of 2020, which is consistent with results from a German panel study that compared attitudes in the months just prior to the pandemic to those in March and April of 2020 (Drouhot et al 2021).…”

Violent Elections and Citizens’ Support for Democratic Constraints on the Executive: Evidence From Nigeria

“…Some studies focus on diffuse threats, for example, how sociocultural and economic transformations of Western societies challenge traditional hierarchies, producing an "authoritarian reflex" among socially conservative groups of voters (e.g., Gidron et al, 2020;Norris, 2019). Others relate these attitudes to group-based identity threats originating in migration and changing demographics (e.g., Dinas et al, 2019;Dustmann et al, 2019;Nordø & Ivarsflaten, 2022). Scholars have also highlighted the pernicious role of polarization in undermining voters' willingness to punish the authoritarian temptations of elected leaders.…”