The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories

Stöcker, Michael

doi:10.2307/2025782

Cited by 775 publications

(147 citation statements)

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“…One attraction of character-based approaches is that they appear to escape worries about what we might call the "creepiness" of theorydriven moral reflection; the decreased authenticity and increased alienation that are supposed to afflict theoretical approaches to morality (Doris 2002, p. 152) Fair enough, if virtue theory falls back to deliberate ideal, and requires people to reflect on a virtuous exemplar when they behave, then it reintroduces the problem of theoretical mediation other normative ethics have suffered from. As Stocker famously noted, visiting a friend in hospital because it is your duty does not sound quite right (Stocker 1976); as does the case in which you visit because that is what morally virtuous people would do.…”

Section: Egalitarianismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Situationism, virtue epistemology, and self-determination theory

Iizuka

2018

Synthese

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Situationists (e.g., Doris in Lack of character: personality and moral behavior, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; Harman in Proc Aristot Soc 99:315-331, 1999. https://doi.org/10.2307/4545312), with reference to empirical work in psychology, have called into question the predictive and explanatory power of character traits and on this basis have criticized the empirical adequacy of moral virtue. More recently, Alfano (Philos Q 62(247):223-249, 2012; Character as moral fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) has extended the situationist critique from virtue ethics to virtue epistemology. On the line he advances, virtue responsibilism-the view that intellectual character traits play an important part in traditional and untraditional epistemological inquiries-is criticized as empirically inadequate in light of the extent to which individuals are shown to be susceptible to seemingly trivial and epistemically irrelevant situational influences. Alfano's attempted redeployment of the situationist challenge to virtue responsibilism is on closer inspection not as straightforward as he claims. It is granted that the empirical adequacy of virtue responsibilism will be eventually threatened if it can be shown that virtuous motivation is, in light of situational factors, causally ineffective. As it turns out, various psychological studies which situationists have overlooked, suggest that virtuous motivation is causally efficacious in a way that favours the position of the virtue responsibilist over the situationist. In the first part of this paper, I outline the hard core of virtue theory: both a rich motivation requirement, and a commitment to the inherent relation between virtue and a good life; then I assess whether these are undermined by situationist criticism. I address the confusion of the existing debate, and the conclusion drawn is that virtue theory ultimately remains unscathed. In the second part of my 123Synthese paper I defend the empirical adequacy of virtue theory based on self-determination theory. When we afford closer attention to studies on the orientation of our motivation, it becomes clear how the dynamics of our motivation have a tremendous influence on desirable behavioural outcomes: a good life.

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Section: Egalitarianismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Situationism, virtue epistemology, and self-determination theory

Iizuka

2018

Synthese

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“…It can support the standpoint of Aristotelian moral development, which emphasizes the importance of early habituation of moral norms for the acquisition of moral virtue and eudaimonia. Of course, a continent person, who has developed moral reasoning without early-habituation of moral virtue, can behave morally because she knows well what is morally appropriate (Kristjánsson 2013;Fowers 2014); however, because moral norm and affection are not completely integrated into her selfhood, they become a sort of external imperative for her, not a natural trait, and can hardly serve for her moral flourishing and happiness (Stocker 2003). Thus, the neuroscientific investigation corresponds to this Aristotelian account on moral development, which emphasizes the importance of early internalization of moral virtue for the future development of moral character, including moral reasoning.…”

Section: Motivational Externalism and Social Neurosciencementioning

confidence: 99%

How can neuroscience contribute to moral philosophy, psychology and education based on Aristotelian virtue ethics?

Han

2016

International Journal of Ethics Education

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The present essay discusses the relationship between moral philosophy, psychology and education based on virtue ethics, contemporary neuroscience, and how neuroscientific methods can contribute to studies of moral virtue and character. First, the present essay considers whether the mechanism of moral motivation and developmental model of virtue and character are well supported by neuroscientific evidence. Particularly, it examines whether the evidence provided by neuroscientific studies can support the core argument of virtue ethics, that is, motivational externalism. Second, it discusses how experimental methods of neuroscience can be applied to studies in human morality. Particularly, the present essay examines how functional and structural neuroimaging methods can contribute to the development of the fields by reviewing the findings of recent social and developmental neuroimaging experiments. Meanwhile, the present essay also considers some limitations embedded in such discussions regarding the relationship between the fields and suggests directions for future studies to address these limitations.

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“…The main topic of discussion in the contemporary literature on friendship is the extent to which various moral theories induce 'moral schizophrenia' by calling on us to be motivated by abstract principlessuch as maximizing good outcomes or acting from duty-that seem incompatible with the warmth and intimacy of friendship (Stocker 1976). While this is an interesting issue, it is only tangentially related to the central questions of friendship: What does it mean to be a friend?…”

Section: The Historical Motivementioning

confidence: 99%