The Scale and Geography of Collusion in the European Market: A Longitudinal View

Abstract

Europe has a long history of cartels, but the changes in the scale and geography of collusion in the European market from the post-war decades until the present have not been systematically investigated. Using network analysis methods and an original dataset based on decisions in EU cartel cases, this paper maps the developments in detected collusion in the European market from 1958 to 2008 and tentatively explains these developments. It appears that collusive activities increased during the 1960s and after the mid-1980s and that a long decline in the scale of collusion began in the mid-1990s. Moreover, the geographical spread of collusive activities in Europe increased considerably from 1969 to 1993. To facilitate an explanation of these and other findings, the paper presents a three-dimensional analytical framework that emphasises the importance of anti-cartel regulation, major changes in the business environment and the size of national economies.

The European Commission's Fight against Cartels (1962–2014): A Retrospective and Forensic Analysis

“…Secondly, a forensic analysis of all sanctioned cartels since the EU's foundation to 2014 has been undertaken, and the underlying dynamics across different stages are analyzed. 1 Carree et al (2010) have already studied the procedures of all the European Commission's decisions taken on antitrust cases up to 2004; while Buch-Hansen and Levallois (2015) studied European cartels up to 2008 offering a geographical perspective on uncovered collusion. As far as we know, this is the first article that undertakes such a detailed analysis up to 2014 that discusses the dynamics of effectiveness of EU cartel policy across time.…”