The salvo combat model with a sequential exchange of fire

Armstrong, Michael J.

doi:10.1057/jors.2013.115

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…This study is also similar in style to the salvo models of naval missile combat of Hughes (1995) and Armstrong (2005Armstrong ( , 2014. In that context, the interplay between offensive missiles and defensive interceptions is central, and salvo size is a key parameter (Armstrong, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

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Modeling Short-Range Ballistic Missile Defense and Israel's Iron Dome System

Armstrong

2014

Operations Research

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This paper develops a model of short-range ballistic missile defense and uses it to study the performance of Israel's Iron Dome system. The deterministic base model allows for inaccurate missiles, unsuccessful interceptions, and civil defense. Model enhancements consider the trade-offs in attacking the interception system, the difficulties faced by militants in assembling large salvos, and the effects of imperfect missile classification by the defender. A stochastic model is also developed. Analysis shows that system performance can be highly sensitive to the missile salvo size, and that systems with higher interception rates are more "fragile" when overloaded. The model is calibrated using publically available data about Iron Dome's use during Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012. If the systems performed as claimed, they saved Israel an estimated 1778 casualties and $80 million in property damage, and thereby made preemptive strikes on Gaza about 8 times less valuable to Israel. Gaza militants could have inflicted far more damage by grouping their rockets into large salvos, but this may have been difficult given Israel's suppression efforts. Counter-battery fire by the militants is unlikely to be worthwhile unless they can obtain much more accurate missiles.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

“…This single-attempt assumption is similar that of Brown et al (2005), but is different from other BMD models such as Soland (1987) and Wilkening (1999). Aside from Tiah (2007), it also differs from most naval salvo model research, such as Hughes (1995) and Armstrong (2005Armstrong ( , 2014.…”

Section: Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 98%

Modeling Short-Range Ballistic Missile Defense and Israel's Iron Dome System

Armstrong

2014

Operations Research

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“…Ozawa's assumption-that a relatively small air strike force could produce good results in the battle between CVs if it could attack first-was proven wrong. The fact deserves to be reiterated that Armstrong (2014) pointed out that, in the battle between aircraft carriers, it is advantageous to attack first. However, as shown in this article, even if an attack is launched first, it cannot achieve a positive result if attacking aircraft are unable to break through the enemy's air defences.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Imperial Japanese Navy and the battle of the Philippine Sea: An analysis of the main causes of defeat

Yagi

2021

Journal of Military Studies

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This article aims to demonstrate through mathematical analysis that the primary reason for the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in the battle of the Philippine Sea during World War II (WWII) was quantitative, and that the defeat is particularly attributable to the lack of force concentration. Scholars have placed much emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the forces involved, such as the skill of IJN pilots or the air defence capabilities of the United States Navy (USN), in seeking to explain the Japanese defeat. We, however, assert that in this naval battle, quantitative factors played a more important role than qualitative ones. Accordingly, we offer an improved version of the mathematical model of Armstrong and Powell, which was previously used to analyse battles between aircraft carriers (CVs). The coefficients in our mathematical model will then be estimated and verified using historical data from the main battles between CVs of the IJN and USN during WWII. Finally, we will analyse the factors underlying the IJN’s defeat in the Battle of the Philippine Sea using the model. This study proposes a useful technique for evaluating quantitative and qualitative aspects of naval forces.

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“…The Hughes' salvo equations focus on the damage inflicted by each volley of a naval battle (Armstrong, ; Hughes, ). Most studies explore the relative importance of force size, offensive capabilities, defensive capabilities, and survivability (Armstrong, , , ). Moving to avoid fire is not a relevant tactic, but there is another tactic in the naval setting that has a trade‐off similar to moving in the artillery context.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of artillery shoot‐and‐scoot tactics

Shim

Atkinson

2018

Naval Research Logistics

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Firing multiple artillery rounds from the same location has two main benefits: a high rate of fire at the enemy and improved accuracy as the shooter's aim adjusts to previous rounds. However, firing repeatedly from the same location carries significant risk that the enemy will detect the artillery's location. Therefore, the shooter may periodically move locations to avoid counter‐battery fire. This maneuver is known as the shoot‐and‐scoot tactic. This article analyzes the shoot‐and‐scoot tactic for a time‐critical mission using Markov models. We compute optimal move policies and develop heuristics for more complex and realistic settings. Spending a reasonable amount of time firing multiple shots from the same location is often preferable to moving immediately after firing an initial salvo. Moving frequently reduces risk to the artillery, but also limits the artillery's ability to inflict damage on the enemy.

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The salvo combat model with a sequential exchange of fire

Cited by 9 publications

References 14 publications

Modeling Short-Range Ballistic Missile Defense and Israel's Iron Dome System

Modeling Short-Range Ballistic Missile Defense and Israel's Iron Dome System

The Imperial Japanese Navy and the battle of the Philippine Sea: An analysis of the main causes of defeat

Analysis of artillery shoot‐and‐scoot tactics

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