The ṣa'da War in Yemen: between Politics and Sectarianism

Political bargaining and violent conflict: shifting elite alliances as the decisive factor in Yemen’s transformation

“…Between 2004 and 2010, Ansarullah and the central government fought six rounds of war, displacing hundreds of thousands of people. In the course of the confrontation, tribes were dragged into the battles, including the Ahmars, who began to employ Salafi militias against Ansarullah (Brandt, 2014b: 115;Dorlian, 2011). The Houthi conflict also became a tool in the elite conflict over political succession, as Saleh used it to sap the military potential of his potential rival Ali Mohsin, whose FAD bore the brunt of the fighting (Phillips, 2011: 93-95).…”

Sectarianism in The Yemeni Political Field. (c2020)

“…His discourse, therefore, incorporated several themes including anti-Western and sectarian discourse in addition to a more general political Islamic thought, as will be discussed in this chapter. Consequently, as Dorlian (2011) maintains, the Houthi movement strategically promoted sectarian discourse when it was best to do so and downplayed it-by emphasizing a united Muslim front-when standing in opposition to US imperialism and its foreign policy calamities. Hussein's lectures were recorded and distributed using cassette tapes inside and beyond Saʿdah; as a result, his influence grew substantially and he was viewed as a "hero" by many tribesmen, Zaydis, and sada who had been marginalized under the regime's rule (Brandt, 2017, p.150).…”

“…Clausen asserts that the Ansarullah movement has fought against economic and political disenfranchisement and that the Yemeni conflict is caused by a deep-rooted and an internal "power struggle" which has been exacerbated by regional interference and the use of "sectarian overtones" (2015, p.27). Samy Dorlian also compliments Salloukh ( 2018) and Clausen's (2015) analyses, arguing that the group is part of a local struggle that has garnered local and regional attention through the use of sectarian discourse (Dorlian, 2011). Dorlian explains that although references to Iran and Hizbullah have been made by Husain Al-Houthi, "aid from Iran to the Zaydi 'rebels' was never demonstrated to exist" (2011, p. 191), at least not during its early stages of development and not to the extent that some media has claimed.…”

“…Moreover, they dedicate most of their attention to the dynamics that unfolded during and after the 2011 uprising and overlook the process that caused these very dynamics to erupt as a result of several reconfigurations that took place over the longue durée. And while other literature (Clausen, 2015;Vom Bruck, 2010;Dorlian, 2011) provide further contextual information to understand the rise of the Houthi movement, they do not explain why actors engaged in the struggle over the political field have chosen to employ sectarian discourse, inter alia. Hence, as noted by Brandt, our perception of the conflict has often overlooked the forces "pushing forward the battles on the ground" (2017, p.154).…”

“…Dorlian explains that although references to Iran and Hizbullah have been made by Husain Al-Houthi, "aid from Iran to the Zaydi 'rebels' was never demonstrated to exist" (2011, p. 191), at least not during its early stages of development and not to the extent that some media has claimed. Dorlian (2011) maintains that Ansarullah have been part of a complex confessionalized conflict, in which sectarian differences and rhetoric have been strategically promoted by the Houthis when it was best to do so and downplayed-by emphasizing a united Muslim front-when standing in opposition to US imperialism and its foreign policy calamities. Salih's regime has also sought to depoliticize and delegitimize its conflict with Ansarullah by depicting it as a confessional issue (Dorlian, 2011, p. 190).…”