The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles

Baev, Pavel

doi:10.4135/9781446279359

Cited by 55 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…32 The first comparative research on Russian peacekeeping was Jonson and Archer (1996); my initial examination of this pattern can be found in Baev (1994); it is elaborated in Baev (1996). 33 The famous 'march on Pristina' conducted by a Russian peacekeeping unit deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina marked the last desperate attempt to employ military instruments; see Allison (2004: 147).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Thucydides’ Three Security Dilemmas in Post-Soviet Strife1

Baev

2006

Journal of Military Ethics

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Attempting to apply the logic of conflict analysis developed by Thucydides to the chaotic spasms and clashes triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union might appear inappropriate to many classical scholars, and entirely artificial to most Eurasian security experts. However, the two strategic landscapes, though separated by a period of some 2400 years, share a number of common features, and the ideas of the ancient strategic analyst may prove helpful for discovering structure in the chaotic violence of more recent times. The notion of the 'strategic dilemma' *one that Thucydides never used but is credited with inventing *lies at the centre of this investigation, which seeks to test the applicability of the notion in three distinctive settings: in a bipolar confrontation; in conflict manipulation by a third party; and in secessionist conflicts. The article suggests that, as an instrument of political analysis, the security dilemma tends to overpredict conflicts and essentially comes out as a trap of self-fulfilling 'worst-case' expectations, so that nowadays *much as in ancient Greece *whenever a security dilemma determines a political decision, disaster follows.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Thucydides’ Three Security Dilemmas in Post-Soviet Strife1

Baev

2006

Journal of Military Ethics

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“…It also was a contributory factor to the two wars Russia has fought to suppress secessionist rebels in Chechnya (1994-96, and 1999 onwards), although the Russian military's conduct of both wars shows that it has yet to incorporate the lessons of the failures its Soviet predecessor suffered in Afghanistan into its current doctrine. 57 Could the Soviets have won? Mark Galeotti points out that in proportion to the US war effort in Vietnam Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was far more limited, and he argues that a greater concentration of force could have defeated the mujahidin.…”

Section: The Aftermathmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Soviet–Afghan War, 1978–1989: An Overview¹

Hughes¹

2008

Defence Studies

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“…13 Preoccupied with the demands of urgent political, social and economic problems, the systematic adaptation of security and defence policies was not an immediate priority and there was a distinct lack of clarity on guidelines and doctrines regarding Russia's security interests and the military reforms required to protect them. 14 In the early 1990s, for the newly established Russian Federation, its armed forces' unpreparedness to deal with small wars and insurgencies quickly emerged as the most immediate concern. The rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the eruption of a number of violent clashes on Russia's periphery and within its own borders.…”

Section: Small War Renewalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russian responses to the changing character of war

Renz¹

2019

International Affairs

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For much of the post-Soviet era there was a widespread belief that improving capabilities required for dealing with local small wars and insurgencies was the central focus of Russian military reforms. As a result, Moscow's military assertiveness and return to geopolitical rivalries since 2014 came as a surprise to many in the West. The article argues that small wars were never the major focus of Russian military transformation and reforms. Tracing the country's experience of war and conflict regionally and internationally since the end of the Cold War, and the impact this had on Moscow's views on what kind of armed forces it required, the article shows that the Kremlin's military ambitions started to diverge dramatically from western expectations as early as the mid-1990s. Russia never really saw armed forces geared towards small and ‘new war’-type scenarios as sufficient for upholding its regional and international status ambitions. Moreover, the Kremlin's growing preoccupation with internal order and regime stability has increasingly reinforced the rhetoric of a hostile West, which is used to justify the increasing centralization of domestic politics. Russia's military revival has been long in the making and poses serious challenges to its neighbours and to the West.

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The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles

Cited by 55 publications

References 0 publications

Thucydides’ Three Security Dilemmas in Post-Soviet Strife1

Thucydides’ Three Security Dilemmas in Post-Soviet Strife1

The Soviet–Afghan War, 1978–1989: An Overview¹

Russian responses to the changing character of war

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The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles

Cited by 55 publications

References 0 publications

Thucydides’ Three Security Dilemmas in Post-Soviet Strife1

Thucydides’ Three Security Dilemmas in Post-Soviet Strife1

The Soviet–Afghan War, 1978–1989: An Overview1

Russian responses to the changing character of war

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Product

Resources

About

The Soviet–Afghan War, 1978–1989: An Overview¹