The rumouring of SARS during the 2003 epidemic in China

Abstract

By analysing rumour content as covered by major Chinese newspapers, this article explores the multiple dimensions of SARS-related rumouring throughout China during the 2003 epidemic. Findings indicate a strong correlation between the scale of SARS infections and level of rumour activities across regions. As for channels of dissemination, the rumour process still found a natural habitat in word of mouth, while internet-based platforms and cell phone text messaging emerged as viable grapevines. Our particular typology of SARS-incurred rumours leads us to identify four distinct types of rumours: legendary rumours; aetiological narratives; proto-memorates; and bogies. The four types of rumours are discussed against the background of superstitious beliefs, folklore practices, popular mentalities, and China's particular socio-political information environment.

Predictors of the authenticity of Internet health rumours

“…There are different types of classification schemes regarding rumours. According to the thematic prominence of rumours, Tai and Sun identified four distinct types of rumours: legendary rumours, aetiological narratives, protomemorates and bogies. Knapp presented a threefold classification: pipe dream rumours that reflect wished‐for outcomes, bogie rumours that invoke feared or anxiety‐inducing outcomes, and wedge‐driver rumours that derogate certain groups or classes of people.…”

Information Dilemmas and Blame‐Avoidance Strategies: From Secrecy to Lightning Rods in Chinese Health Crises

“…On March 12, the WHO issued a global alert based on the Hanoi outbreak. Although SARS was then traced to China, Chinese authorities in subsequent months denied any wrongdoing or cover‐up (Tai and Sun ). Local authorities were slow to pass messages on to national authorities, and national authorities suppressed information to the public (Huang ; Tai and Sun ).…”

“…But domestically and publicly, the epidemic remained downplayed or secret outright. In a press conference as late as April 3, China's minister of health insisted that China was managing SARS effectively (Tai and Sun ). Provincial authorities also sought to keep critical voices out of mass media, and allowed articles ridiculing the idea that anything out of the ordinary was happening (Saich ).…”

“…On April 8, 2003 he defied the risk of prosecution by emailing his situation report directly to Germany's Der Spiegel and Time Magazine in the United States. In turn, these newspapers’ online coverage spread to China's general public (Tai and Sun ).…”

“…On April 17, 2003, the CPC's national leadership (the Politburo) finally acknowledged publicly that China had made mistakes. It then declared “Anti‐SARS People's War” and publicly mobilized government agencies, local communities, and mass media (Tai and Sun ). The Politburo also demanded publicly that all local officials make regular, accurate, and honest reports on SARS’ spread.…”