The Rule of Non‐Opposition: Opening Up Decision‐Making by Consensus

Urfalino, Philippe

doi:10.1111/jopp.12037

Cited by 26 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…But it is precisely because of its sensitivity to the different weights of participants, that the rule also has a high normative status in arenas and cultures that emphasise cohesion and solidarity over the sovereignty of the individual (cf. Urfalino 2014;Wiredu 1998) or are openly and admittedly hierarchical, such as administrative committees where employers and their employees sit together.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Due to the extended discussions under consensus rule, intensities of preferences additionally determine an agent's weight and thus increase inequalities (Coleman 1990, p. 858). 12 In comparison to majority voting, the consensus rule is surely not as open towards social diversity, since its processes are strongly shaped by a strive towards a joint, undisputed decision; when disagreement remains, there will be strong pressure not to speak up and claim a veto right (Ehlermann and Ehring 2005, p. 66;Urfalino 2014), but to support a proposal for the sake of the group, for instance.…”

Section: Input-legitimacy: Democratic Self-determination Under Consenmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Participants of consensus procedures will typically show cooperative attitudes and a certain commitment towards a joint group decision. For this matter, they will engage in intensive communication and largely inclusive deliberation (Coleman 1990, p. 381), and ensure that all serious concerns have been allayed (Urfalino 2014). 8 Possible objections become apparent during the process and can be dealt with in communication.…”

Section: How the "Logic Of Appropriateness" Restricts Veto Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This procedure has been called decision-making by "apparent consensus" and "non-opposition" (Urfalino 2014), by "sounding out" (Olsen 1972), by "interpretation" (Steiner and Dorff 1980;Dorff and Steiner 1981), by "nearunanimity" (Scharpf 1997, p. 145;cf. also Beatty and O'Moore 2010) or "informal unanimity" (El-Hakim 1978) and by "tacit consent" (cf.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yet, theoretical considerations of this decision rule that go beyond the single case and try to describe general features or the logic of this technique of decision making have been relatively rare (cf. however Coleman 1990;Krick 2015;Olsen 1972;Thiele 2008;Urfalino 2014). These bodies of work will be built upon prominently to describe the logics of tacit consent decision-making and to point to typical empirical phenomena and variations.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Myth of Effective Veto Power under the Rule of Consensus. Dynamics and Democratic Legitimacy of Collective Decision-Making by “Tacit Consent”

Krick¹

2017

Négociations

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The study challenges the widespread assumption that the decision rule of 'consensus', whereby decisions are made by 'tacit consent', i.e. without voting and through the absence of open dissent, attributes veto power to each decision-maker. It addresses this assumption from a conceptual, an analytical and an empirical point of view and reassesses the democratic value of this decision rule and its empirical applicability in this light.The main argument of the study is that veto options are restricted in so many ways under the rule of consensus that this general assumption is misleading. It is shown that the power to veto collective decisions under consensus rule is severely limited by various social mechanisms and norms, that it is furthermore asymmetrically distributed amongst decision-makers and additionally de-activated in a large share of empirical cases by an effective 'shadow of majority voting'.A comprehensive assessment of input-and output-related dimensions of democratic legitimacy shows how the equality of participation and of influence and the norms of transparency and accountability are violated by the restricted veto options and by the ambiguous preference order that follows from the peculiar logic of this decision rule, while the rule's efficiency is striking and group commitment is typically not lower than under voting rules. Considering strengths and weaknesses of the decision rule, its suitability in various political contexts is discussed.Key words : consensus, collective decision-making, tacit consent, veto power, democratic legitimacy.Cette étude discute l'hypothèse courante selon laquelle la règle de décision par consensus, par laquelle les décisions sont prises par « consentement tacite », c'est-à-dire sans vote et en absence d'une dissidence ouverte, attribue un pouvoir de veto à chaque décideur. IntroductionCollective decisions are very often generated by use of a decision rule that differs substantially from the unanimity rule of full, active group consent: with all kinds of empirical variations, political organisations as diverse as intergovernmental organs (e.g. This contribution challenges the assumption of individual and effective veto power under consensus rule and reassesses the rule's democratic value in this light. It argues that veto options under consensus rule are generally de-activated in "the shadow of majority voting", that the power to effectively veto is furthermore unequally distributed and that its use is generally restricted in various ways through social norms that serve to stabilise efficient consensus arenas (section 3). These arguments are embedded into an analysis of the logics of rule enforcement that provide the background for understanding social dynamics of consensual decision-making (section 2) and a discussion of the normative effects of restricted veto powers from a perspective of democratic legitimacy (section 4). In the conclusion, the findings' implications are discussed. To start with, I provide some background on the mode of consensual decision-making t...

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Input-legitimacy: Democratic Self-determination Under Consenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: How the "Logic Of Appropriateness" Restricts Veto Powermentioning

confidence: 99%