2003
DOI: 10.1057/9780230511569
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The Royal Navy's Home Fleet in World War 2

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Cited by 6 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…149 From September 1939 surface raiders caused havoc to Allied maritime communications through physical destruction and delays caused by the need to reroute and escort transatlantic convoys. 150 After the destruction of the Graf Spee in December 1939 the Admiralty was very concerned about the prospect of more and larger German vessels coming into service, and in January 1940 the director of plans concluded that it was 'the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin which is likely to provide our most disagreeable problem'. A German carrier in the Atlantic would make it hard to hide convoys and would allow raiders to evade Allied hunting groups.…”
Section: The British Perceptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…149 From September 1939 surface raiders caused havoc to Allied maritime communications through physical destruction and delays caused by the need to reroute and escort transatlantic convoys. 150 After the destruction of the Graf Spee in December 1939 the Admiralty was very concerned about the prospect of more and larger German vessels coming into service, and in January 1940 the director of plans concluded that it was 'the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin which is likely to provide our most disagreeable problem'. A German carrier in the Atlantic would make it hard to hide convoys and would allow raiders to evade Allied hunting groups.…”
Section: The British Perceptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…93 Levy has suggested that Churchill was trying to maintain an 'aggressive policy in the Mediterranean, while hedging his bets with a more defensive posture at home' and that Forbes's unsolicited and independent opinions endangered this strategy. 94 Churchill seems to have taken Forbes's advice about releasing troops if required elsewhere by sending troops and tanks to fight a 'colonial war' in North Africa while the air fighting over Britain was at its height. 95 Perhaps, for once, Churchill was being indecisive while trying to ascertain the future intentions of the United States during an American presidential election year and it was not until 31 October that the prime minister backed Forbes in front of the war cabinet.…”
Section: IVmentioning
confidence: 99%