The role of the non-productive players in cooperative games with transferable utilities: a survey

Kakoty, Niharika; Baruah, P. K.; Borkotokey, Surajit

doi:10.1080/03081079.2021.1933467

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Improving the Shapley value method can reduce the economic loss caused by downtime and promote multi-factory cooperation [ 28 ]. In addition, through the application of the improved Shapley value method, the production and delivery time cycle will be shortened and found that it can be applied to any industry of concern to improve operations [ 29 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Decision Method for Benefit Distribution Mechanism of Shared End Distribution on Shapley Value

Zhang

Hou

2022

Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience

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Online shopping has led to the rapid development of e-commerce, and at the same time, the pressure of offline distribution has increased abruptly. Therefore, a current development trend is to share end-to-end distribution against the background of the Internet. The main research content of this paper is the benefit distribution mechanism of shared end distribution. Based on an analysis of the current situation of interest distribution, this paper proposes factors that affect interest distribution from the perspectives of individuals and groups. The suitable income distribution mode of enterprise alliances is chosen from two dimensions—cooperation mode and coordination mechanism. Based on extant theory, this paper proposes a benefit distribution scheme-selection mechanism based on the modified Shapley value method and takes the terminal distribution in the Haidian District of Beijing as an example. The revised income distribution results better reflect the income-generating abilities of different enterprises within a cooperative organization and assign different benefit proportions to this cooperative organization based on different income-generating capacities to provide development incentives and, at the same time, better achieve income distribution.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Decision Method for Benefit Distribution Mechanism of Shared End Distribution on Shapley Value

Zhang

Hou

2022

Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience

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“…In Abe and Nakada (2019) the ED is generalized to obtain a weighted division and the corresponding axiomatization is obtained. For a comprehensive study of all these values, we refer to Béal et al (2017), Borkotokey et al (2020a, 2020b), Casajus (2011, 2012), Choudhury et al (2020), Kakoty et al (2021), and Nowak and Radzik (1994).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size

Borkotokey

Choudhury

Kumar

et al. 2023

Int J of Economic Theory

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We propose and characterize a new value for TU cooperative games based on egalitarian distribution of worths in smaller coalitions and players' marginal productivity in larger coalitions. This value belongs to the class of Procedural values due to Malawski. Our value is identical with the Shapley value on one extreme and the Equal Division rule on the other extreme. We show that our value is identical with the solidarity value due to Bèal et al. of the dual game. However, by duality, our characterization intuitively improves over the axiomatization of this solidarity value. We also provide a mechanism that implements our value in sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, a generalized version of this value is proposed followed by its characterizations.

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The Choquet integral-based Shapley function for n-person cooperative games with probabilistic hesitant fuzzy coalitions

Lin

Zhang

Huang

et al. 2023

Expert Systems with Applications

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The role of the non-productive players in cooperative games with transferable utilities: a survey

Cited by 4 publications

References 29 publications

A Decision Method for Benefit Distribution Mechanism of Shared End Distribution on Shapley Value

A Decision Method for Benefit Distribution Mechanism of Shared End Distribution on Shapley Value

A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size

The Choquet integral-based Shapley function for n-person cooperative games with probabilistic hesitant fuzzy coalitions

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