The role of public administrators in public policy making: Practice and prospects in Nigeria

Abstract

In Nigeria, as elsewhere, the role of the career bureaucracy in public policy making has constituted a subject of conflicting interpretation, practice, and prescription. Although higher public servants have always played a major part in shaping public policy, the extent of their involvement has ebbed and flowed in response to legal, structural, and political changes at the federal, state, and local government levels. In recent years, the exercise of policy making and implementing roles by public administrators has evoked mounting public criticism and top-level career servants in Nigeria have faced unusually serious challenges to their authority. Moreover, confusion over the proper scope of administrative involvement in policy formulation and execution reached new heights both within and outside the public services following the adoption of elected executive forms of government in 1979.The article traces the shifts in bureaucratic policy-making roles and relationships which occurred in the First Republic period, under different military regimes, and immediately following the return to civilian rule. The prospect that more fundamental changes will be forthcoming in the nature and extent of administrative involvement in public policy formation and execution is then explored in the context of past and current practice and conventions, key provisions of the 1979 Constitution, and recent social, political, and economic developments. The author concludes that public administrators will continue to be centrally involved in the policy-making process under present structural arrangements and that a reorientation of the public services away from their prevailing preoccupation with promoting vested interests requires the development of more broadly based political organizations. BUREAUCRATIC INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC POLICY MAKING IN NIGERIAIn Nigeria, as elsewhere in the world, considerable conflict and controversy have surrounded the role of public administrators in the making of public policies. This section traces the impact of colonial patterns on administrative behaviour and analyses the shifts in policy formulating and executing roles and relationships which occurred in the First Republic period, under different military regimes, and immediately following the return to civilian rule. The focus here is on the extent of bureaucratic involvement in the policy-making process.

Interrogating the Non-Justiciability of Constitutional Directive Principles and Public Policy Failure in Nigeria

“…There are evidences from scholarship to establish the importance of formulation antecedents and process as critical to policy successes in Nigeria (Olaiya, 2010a;Olaiya, 2010b;Ebienfa, 2009;Koehn, 1983;Aminu, Tella & Mbaya, 2012;Paki & Ebienfa;and Ugwuanyi & Chukwuemeka, 2013) To this end, and bearing in mind the need to formulate enduring public policies in the area of economic and socio-cultural rights, the study concluded on the following critical stance: (a) There is urgent need to promulgate laws that will serve as the backbones of policies on economic and social rights not only to ensure consistency but also to foster continuity; (b) there is also the need to be more constitutional in all aspects of the formulation of social right policies to prevent abuse in the highest possible regards and, most importantly, to ensure popularity of the policies as the constitution is the mother law that a good number of members of the society are familiar with; and the prevailing situation of lack of assertive position by the courts between the provisions of Section 6(6)c of the 1999 Constitution and Article 24 of the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCRs) should be resolved, either by outright amendment to the relevant part of the 1999 constitution or by the legislature exercising its power in Item 60(a) of the Exclusive Legislative List.…”

Impacts of Political Breaks on Education Policies, Access and Quality in Nigeria (1970 – 2003)

“…Also, Adebayo (1979) observes that during 1966-1975, some State Governments had up to seven permanent secretaries that were stationed in the Military Governor's office and had the responsibility for almost the entire range of political, economic, administrative and industrial activities of the government. The military consciously drew top public servants deeper into policy-formulation responsibilities (Luckham, 1971;Koehn, 1983).…”

“…The direct involvement of bureaucrats in the military junta's policy-making process was initiated by Ironsi and advanced by Gowon (Asiodu, 1970;Aliyu, 1979;Adebayo, 1979;Koehn, 1983). This was attributed to the military juntas' lack of experience, their unwillingness to appoint ousted politicians to positions of responsibilities and the relatively low level of education many military personnel had (Koehn, 1983).…”

“…The direct involvement of bureaucrats in the military junta's policy-making process was initiated by Ironsi and advanced by Gowon (Asiodu, 1970;Aliyu, 1979;Adebayo, 1979;Koehn, 1983). This was attributed to the military juntas' lack of experience, their unwillingness to appoint ousted politicians to positions of responsibilities and the relatively low level of education many military personnel had (Koehn, 1983). Adebayo (1979) and Koehn (1983) observe that the military governors of states did not mind travelling to Lagos (where federal permanent secretaries lived) to lobby them for support on issues that would be brought to the Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council for consideration.…”

“…This was attributed to the military juntas' lack of experience, their unwillingness to appoint ousted politicians to positions of responsibilities and the relatively low level of education many military personnel had (Koehn, 1983). Adebayo (1979) and Koehn (1983) observe that the military governors of states did not mind travelling to Lagos (where federal permanent secretaries lived) to lobby them for support on issues that would be brought to the Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council for consideration. Thus, it may be concluded that the military acted with the support of bureaucrats they co-opted or influenced to work with them.…”