The Role of Power in EU–Russia Energy Relations: The Interplay between Markets and Geopolitics

Siddi, Marco

doi:10.1080/09668136.2018.1536925

Cited by 48 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…The Third Energy Package was planned to restrict the dominance of Gazprom and put an end to its adaptation strategy through downstream integration in the EU (Boussena & Locatelli, 2013). The Gas Directive as the heart of TEP was designed and legislated to reduce the possibility of the dominance of certain companies by increasing the competition between external suppliers over EU energy market (Siddi, 2018). As a result, the 'Gazprom clause' in the TEP limits the ownership of energy distribution assets within the EU by the external energy providers, which ultimately constrains Russia's destructive dominance in the EU energy market (Goldthau & Sitter, 2014).…”

Section: Results and Findingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Outcome of Directive 2009/73/EC Amendment on EU’s Natural Gas Security

Keypour¹

2019

Baltic Journal of European Studies

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The European Commission has proposed an amendment on the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC to broaden the applicability of the Directive to all gas pipelines from/to the EU including Nord Stream 2. This research focuses on the question of whether the amendment can really boost EU’s natural gas security, by hindering Nord Stream 2. Thematic analysis has been employed as the methodology for analyzing collected data from primary and secondary sources, and relying on a legal and political analysis. The research findings show that although the amendment hinders Nord Stream 2, it also affects the operation of the existing interconnectors adversely. It also declines investors’ tendency for planned pipelines, which lowers EU’s energy security. Moreover, empowerment of the Commission in the proposed amendment curtails Member States’ plans to enhance their energy security. In addition, the security analysis of the research shows that Moscow’s ability to take advantage of its “energy weapon” is being defied because of dependence on European technology and finance, particularly under the sanction condition. Therefore, restraining Russian gas in the European market will not result in a higher level of energy security since reliable and affordable alternatives are not so available. Hence, all four elements of energy security—that is, affordability, availability, accessibility, and acceptability—are jeopardized by the proposed amendment. The current study concludes that although the amendment is expected to boost the energy security of the Union, it may now turn into a threat per se.

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Section: Results and Findingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Outcome of Directive 2009/73/EC Amendment on EU’s Natural Gas Security

Keypour¹

2019

Baltic Journal of European Studies

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“…The resilience in their gas relations is further illustrated by the Nord Stream-2 project. This project will bolster the Nord Stream route, increasing its capacity from 55 to 110 bcm per year (Siddi 2018(Siddi , 1563. It suggests that Gazprom's commercial ties with European companies and Russia's energy cooperation with its key partner in the EU, namely Germany, will be intensified.…”

Section: The Reversal Of Trade Relations: Eu Sanctions and Russia's Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From the perspective of corporate actors, Siddi (2018Siddi ( , 1566 suggests that 'Gazprom is adapting its business strategy to the EU's regulatory and liberal market model', against the EU's Third Energy Package that aims at liberalising its internal energy market. Instead of cutting the supplies to the European market, Gazprom has been willing to maintain or even consolidate its positions.…”

Section: The Reversal Of Trade Relations: Eu Sanctions and Russia's Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, Gazprom's monopoly on gas exports to the EU would be challenged by other corporate actors. This is evidenced by the beginning of LNG exports by a consortium headed by Novatek, a privately-owned Russian company (Siddi 2018(Siddi , 1567. These corporate actors may be driven by business interests and profits more than by geopolitical motivations.…”

Section: The Reversal Of Trade Relations: Eu Sanctions and Russia's Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fragile interdependence: the case of Russia-EU relations

Hua-wei

2020

Cambridge Review of International Affairs

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This article situates the interdependence debate in IR theories within contemporary world politics and reconsiders the concept of complex interdependence against current deglobalizing dynamics. A notion of fragile interdependence is developed to explore the reversibility of interdependent relationships, an issue which has become increasingly important. Russia-EU relations, during and in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, serve as the core case study to illustrate the implications of the theoretical debate. The focus is placed on two dimensions of their interdependent relationship: (non-energy) trade and gas. Although both dimensions have been reversed during this geopolitical crisis, there has been a contrasting pattern. In a comparative manner, the case study illustrates the ramifications of the theoretical debate, and, more importantly, the extent to which complex or fragile interdependence is relevant. This article argues that fragile interdependence would better capture the reversals, although, at the same time, complex interdependence may still be relevant to account for the rebound in resilient interdependent relationships. I am grateful to Prof. Roy Allison, who supervised my master thesis at the University of Oxford. This article has been developed on the basis of my master thesis. Many thanks go to Prof. Elena Korosteleva, who is my primary supervisor at Kent University. Special thanks go to Prof. Richard Sakwa, who offered great insights and huge encouragement. I highly appreciate the helpful comments from five anonymous reviewers and the assigned editor of the CRIA.

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“…Russia has attempted to maximize its power and prestige with all available means, taking advantage of its economic rise (Donaldson et al, 2014). Some European countries have experienced Russia's use of energy stocks as a power leverage for interfering with their internal political issues (Oldberg, 2007;Jonsson and Seely, 2015;Siddi, 2018). On the other hand, Russia has been more likely to escalate militarily when its national interests were perceived to be under threat because of external pressure exerted by great powers, especially the EU and the USA (Asmus, 2009;Götz, 2016b).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Dangerous dyads in the post-Soviet space: explaining Russia's military escalation decisions, 1992–2010

Rosa

Cuppuleri

2021

Riv. ital. sci. polit.

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This paper analyses the military behaviour of Russia from 1992 to 2010. The method used is a combination of the dyad analysis introduced by Stuart Bremer in 1992 and the analysis of unit-level variables, which is distinctive of foreign policy analysis. We empirically test a set of hypotheses about the determinants of Russia's military behaviour in the post-Cold War period by considering the impact of changes of international variables – relative power, the presence of military alliance pacts, the territorial salience of the dispute – and state-level variables – the degree of democracy/autocracy and regime vulnerability. A bivariate and a multivariate analysis are carried out to explain the separate and joint impacts of independent variables.

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The Role of Power in EU–Russia Energy Relations: The Interplay between Markets and Geopolitics

Cited by 48 publications

References 38 publications

The Outcome of Directive 2009/73/EC Amendment on EU’s Natural Gas Security

The Outcome of Directive 2009/73/EC Amendment on EU’s Natural Gas Security

Fragile interdependence: the case of Russia-EU relations

Dangerous dyads in the post-Soviet space: explaining Russia's military escalation decisions, 1992–2010

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