This article argues in favour of an inferential role for fictions in scientific modelling. The argument proceeds by means of a detailed case study, namely models of the internal structure of stars in stellar astrophysics. The main assumptions in such models are described, and it is argued that they are best understood as useful fictions. The role that conditionals play in these models is explained, and it is argued that fictional assumptions play an important role as either background or antecedent conditions. I then expand on the argument for the compatibility of fictions and scientific realism. I argue that realism and antirealism plausibly offer correspondingly different accounts of the semantics of these fictional conditionals.
The Inferential Role of Scientific FictionsThis is the third and concluding article in a trilogy defending the inferential role that fictions play in scientific modelling. In the previous articles (Suárez 2009(Suárez , 2010, I introduced the idea of inferential expediency as the hallmark of scientific fictions, and I argued that fictions are not incompatible with scientific realism. In this article, I begin by distinguishing fiction from idealisation. I then illustrate the distinction by means of a case study in astrophysics, namely stellar structure models. I identify the relevant fictional assumptions in these models, as well as the three empirical quantities that are the object of observational astrophysics. I describe the corresponding 'fictional conditionals', which provide these models with inferential expediency. I finish by bringing these lessons to bear on the compatibility of the use of fictions in models with scientific realism. In particular, I argue that the realist may choose to offer a nontruth-functional semantics for these conditionals that preserves the thesis that the practice of model building in science aims at truth.