The role of medieval cities and the origins of merchant capitalism

The Ottoman origins of capitalism: uneven and combined development and Eurocentrism

“…91 This was often conducted via 'local estates and assemblies or city-leagues in which the merchantentrepreneurial class wielded significant -even military -power'. 92 Hence a byproduct of European feudal war-making was an attendant rise in the political autonomy, power and influence of merchants, with increasing degrees of representation in the decision-making structures of states. 93 In contrast, the Ottoman Empire had little requirement for monetary financing outside of the customary levies already imposed on agrarian production.…”

“…'It was', writes Eric Mielants, 'precisely the inter-city-state competition for access to Eastern markets and the threat of the expanding Ottoman Empire that led to the discovery of the Americas'. 143 Capitulations 144 came to play a major role in this process, mediating European commercial and Ottoman geopolitical interests through alliance building on the one hand and blockading rivals on the other. The most commercially 'advanced' European states -the Habsburgs, Genoese, Venetians, Spanish, and Portuguese -were excluded, while the more 'backward' French (1536), English (1583), and Dutch (1612) were granted capitulations.…”

Europe and China compared

“…In contrast, the Chinese state under the Ming not only did not decrease costs for its merchants, but actually even increased them: since maritime trade was illegal from the Ming dynasty onward (Wiethoff, 1963), Chinese traders "could hardly do without a minimum of bribery" (Ptak, 1994: 41;McNeill, 1982: 47). This is very important since in the Early Modern Period "the most significant expenses of the long-distance trader were transportation and protection costs" ( Allsen, political and military expansion of the Chinese Empire occurred, the incorporation of 'new frontiers committed the government to a shift of resources to the peripheries, not extraction from them" (Wong, 1997: 148) as was the case in the European mercantilist tradition of city-states and nation-states (Mielants, 2000). Last but not least, one of the reasons why the Chinese were not capable of systematically developing, pursuing, and implementing a strategy of socioeconomic subordination, colonization, and exploitation vis-à-vis the non-Chinese, is the incessant warfare which drained the resources of the Empire, and made China the target of immense and continuous destruction, forcing Chinese military activity to be "directed at defense rather than conquest" (Snooks, 1996: 320).…”

“…Furthermore, the overland trade route to China did not start until the eastern part of the Caspian Sea since Italian ships were active both on the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, the rivers Don and Volga, and the Caspian Sea (Richard, 1970: 362). more luxuries from the East, facilitated by the Pax Mongolica, generated incentive among the European urban-based merchant elite to implement strategies of economic "self-sustained growth" based on colonial exploitation, exploitation of wage laborers and the subsequent commodification, subjugation, domination, and exploitation of the natural realm (Mielants, 2000).°6 The fact remains that in East Asia merchants were kept outside the structures of institutionalized power and decision making, and this weakness wasalthough to a lesser degree-also apparent in the Early Modern Indian Ocean region.57 The combination of growing power over the proletariat at 56 On European "medieval colonialism" see the recent important contributions by Balard (1998) and Torro (2000).…”

“…Although some scholars have suggested that mostly luxury products were transported by the Chinese merchants in the Indian Ocean (e.g., Lewis, 1978: XI, 462), it appears that already under the Sung dynasty significant amounts of bulk goods such as "rice, porcelain, pepper, lumber, and minerals" were transported overseas (Shiba, 1983: 104).3 During the Sung, joint ventures in shipping and leases of vessel services had become "quite common" (Deng, 1997a: 102), and "forms of commenda and societas maris" also came into use (Shiba, 1983: 108). Although the Industrial Revolution (e.g., Vries, 2001: 435;Vries, 2002: 122, 126) is however an unfortunate recurrent theme (see Mielants, 2000) which prevents social scientists from raising questions about the path dependence of different political economies in the long run. The Industrial Revolution only enabled the West to achieve economic growth more rapidly and more intensely (which ultimately widened the gap between the core and the periphery even more) after c. 1800 AD (see the debate between Wallerstein, Hicks, Furtado, and others in Guarducci [1983: 695-746] and essays in Prak, [2001]).…”