The Role of Lawyer-Legislators in Shaping the Law: Evidence from Voting on Tort Reforms

Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois

doi:10.1086/684039

Cited by 31 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Along these lines, contemporary legal scholars have argued that the legal profession’s unique relationship with politics has benefited lawyers both economically and politically (Hadfield ; Posner ). Such claims are consistent with evidence that vocational background can influence the attitudes and choices of legislators (Carnes ; Matter and Stutzer ). Lawyers have also influenced the organization and inner workings of Congress.…”

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confidence: 86%

Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?

Bonica

2020

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?scholars have long sought to explain the overrepresentation of lawyers in Congress. this article draws on a wealth of data to explore the causes and consequences of this representational imbalance. While lawyers enter politics at higher rates, self-selection at best provides a partial explanation. Conditional on running, lawyers win at twice the rate of candidates from other backgrounds. Contrary to prevailing theories in the literature, voters do not reward candidates with backgrounds in law. rather, lawyers win because of a sizable competitive advantage in early fundraising, owing in large part to their professional networks. this study has important implications for who runs for office, who wins, and the demographic composition of Congress. it also identifies an underexplored mechanism by which the us system of campaign finance sustains deep representational imbalances.

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supporting

confidence: 86%

Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?

Bonica

2020

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…Furthermore, the evidence regarding the reform process at the macro level complements recent evidence on individual voting behavior on single tort reform proposals in various tort areas at the micro level. In Matter and Stutzer (2015), we find that Republicans are more likely and lawyer-legislators less likely to support reforms that restrict tort litigation. This paper proceeds as follows.…”

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confidence: 70%

The role of party politics in medical malpractice tort reforms

Matter

Stutzer

2016

European Journal of Political Economy

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The U.S. tort system has experienced various reforms over the last three decades. While there is an extensive literature on the consequences of these reforms, very little is known about their determinants. In this study, we investigate the role of party politics in the reform process across U.S. states. In order to test whether any party effect goes beyond voter preferences, we apply the idea behind regression discontinuity studies based on close electoral outcomes to semi-parametric proportional hazards models. We find that in states with close election outcomes, a narrow Republican majority in the lower house is associated with a 50 to 150 percent higher risk of tort reform enactment compared to a narrow Democratic majority. Our results indicate that party politics plays a role in tort reforms goes over and above potential underlying preferences in the constituency. (JEL classification: D72, K13)

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“…We obtain this information from the financial declarations, as MEPs must report their occupations and related incomes from the three years prior to their taking office. 23 Further, like Gagliarducci et al (2010) in their analysis of moonlighting, we also collect and code the professional background of MEPs in 15 different job families to account for systematic differences in motivation, training and expertise (see Gehlbach et al, 2010;Matter and Stutzer, 2015, who, respectively, find businessmen and lawyers to exhibit distinct candidacy and parliamentary work patterns). As some of the effort variables may be dependent on MEPs' support staff, the number of accredited assistants was retrieved from the EP website.…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Outside Earnings, Electoral Systems and Legislative Effort in the European Parliament

Staat

Kuehnhanss

2016

J of Common Market Studies

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Parliamentarians are often allowed to pursue other work in addition to their mandate. Using data on the 7th European Parliament , we analyze the relationship between the outside earnings of its Members (MEPs) and their parliamentary activities. The supranational nature of the European Parliament thereby allows a novel analysis of 'moonlighting' free of countryspecific bias. We find outside earnings to be negatively correlated with the particularly workintensive production of draft reports and opinions. Utilizing the considerable freedom of Member States in organizing elections, we find this relationship to be dependent on the electoral system under which MEPs are elected. While the effect of the trade-off between outside and parliamentary work is predominantly negative in all other systems, outside earnings of MEPs from centralized but candidate-focused systems correlate positively with their productivity, indicating a possible benefit from selection effects.

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The Role of Lawyer-Legislators in Shaping the Law: Evidence from Voting on Tort Reforms

Cited by 31 publications

References 47 publications

Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?

Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?

The role of party politics in medical malpractice tort reforms

Outside Earnings, Electoral Systems and Legislative Effort in the European Parliament

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