2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.011
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The role of institutional investors in propagating the crisis of 2007–2008

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Cited by 265 publications
(106 citation statements)
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“…The reason is that atomistic agents take prices as given, but on aggregate the equilibrium price depends on their joint behavior. As they do not internalize the possible effects of a generalized fire sale on ex-post borrowing capacity, agents may overborrow, leading to excessive leverage and inflated asset prices (Bianchi, 2011, Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2003, Lorenzoni, 2008, Jeanne and Korinek, 2010, and Stein, 2012Manconi et al, 2012;Merrill et al, 2012;see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov, 2013, for a review).…”
Section: Externalities Related To Fire Sales and Credit Crunchesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The reason is that atomistic agents take prices as given, but on aggregate the equilibrium price depends on their joint behavior. As they do not internalize the possible effects of a generalized fire sale on ex-post borrowing capacity, agents may overborrow, leading to excessive leverage and inflated asset prices (Bianchi, 2011, Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2003, Lorenzoni, 2008, Jeanne and Korinek, 2010, and Stein, 2012Manconi et al, 2012;Merrill et al, 2012;see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov, 2013, for a review).…”
Section: Externalities Related To Fire Sales and Credit Crunchesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, to control for the possibility that EBP shocks may be confounded with uncertainty shocks, we include into the baseline model specification the CBOE VXO implied volatility index which is a popular proxy for uncertainty (see Bloom, 2009 The 2007-08 global financial crisis has revived the literature on the international transmission of financial shocks (see, e.g., Bagliano and Morana, 2012;Fry-McKibbin et al, 2014;Blatt et al, 2015). Several transmission channels through which the turmoil emanating from US financial markets spread to the global economy have been documented, for instance, cross-border holdings of asset-backed securities (e.g., Longstaff, 2010;Manconi et al, 2012) and bank credit default swaps (e.g., Eichengreen et al, 2012), balance-sheet rebalancing by globalized banking conglomerates (e.g., Cettorelli and Goldberg, 2012;Giannetti and Laeven, 2012;De Haas and Van Horen, 2013), equity market contagion (e.g., , and the collapse of global trade (e.g., Bems et al, 2011). Thus far, however, the empirical literature on the link between credit market frictions and international financial spillovers is scarce.…”
Section: Ecb Working Paper 1954 August 2016mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 Investment Company Institute (5 April 2013). 3 On liquidity and financial market runs, and the role of international investors in crisis, see, for instance, Bernardo and Welch (2004) and Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012). 4 See, for example, Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl (2012);Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012); Coval and Stafford (2007);Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012); Raddatz and Schmukler (2011);Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006); Goldstein and Pauzner (2004);and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2001).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%