2004
DOI: 10.1177/0022002703262859
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The Role of Information in Choices Over Income Distributions

Abstract: How people distribute income is investigated, using participants in two experimental treatments—one with and the other without a veil of ignorance. The experiment tests two major hypotheses: (1) the veil of ignorance generates Rawlsian choices, and (2) equal bargaining power and the veto rule generate Rawlsian choices, even though there is no veil of ignorance. Rawlsian choices are defined as those that maximize the income of the lowest income group. Results show that the proportion of Rawlsian choices is bigg… Show more

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Cited by 32 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…We only know of one other study that is somewhat related to our own. Herne and Suojanen (2004) have looked at the role of the veil of ignorance within Rawls's set-up. Their experimental study investigates whether groups of individuals in two simulated original positions, one with and the other without a veil of ignorance, make different choices.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We only know of one other study that is somewhat related to our own. Herne and Suojanen (2004) have looked at the role of the veil of ignorance within Rawls's set-up. Their experimental study investigates whether groups of individuals in two simulated original positions, one with and the other without a veil of ignorance, make different choices.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some experimental studies have been conducted to test the feasibility of the Rawlsian approach to judgements on social welfare (see, e.g., Bond and Park 1991;dela Cruz-Dona and Martina 2000;Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1990;Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992;Frohlich et al 1987a;Frohlich et al 1987b;Herne and Suojanen 2004;Jackson and Hill 1995;Lissowski et al 1991;Oleson 2001;Schildberg-Hörisch 2010;Swope et al 2008). In addition, several scholars have been studied on the implementation of VOI in the laboratory (see, e.g., Beckman et al 2002;Carlsson et al 2003;Johannesson and Gerdtham 1995;Johansson-Stenman et al 2002;Traub et al 2009;Traub et al 2005).…”
Section: Rawlsian Approach To Distributive Justicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the follow-up study, Frohlich and Oppenheimer extended that set-up to economies with production, and found qualitatively similar results. Herne and Suojanen (2004) investigate the behavior of participants for two different original positions: first, the Rawlsian original position behind the veil of ignorance, and second, the Scanlonian original position, which consists of negotiating parties that have full knowledge of their personal characteristics as well as economic and social circumstances, equal bargaining power, and a desire to reach agreement that no one could reasonably reject. Interestingly, the authors found that the Rawlsian outcome was implemented much more often when there was no veil of ignorance (60%) than when there was (14%).…”
Section: Experiments Investigating Principles Of Justicementioning
confidence: 99%