The Role of Economics in Cartel Detection in Europe

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.; Friederiszick, Hans W.; Schmidtchen, Dieter; Albert, Max; Voigt, Stefan

doi:10.1628/186183407785978404

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…The negative effects on static or dynamic competition caused by foreclosure or entry deterrence mentioned here concern unilateral conduct by the commercial division, and collusion as a concept relies on multilateral conduct by a number of firms. 69 Therefore, while the application of art. 101 TFEU to commercial divisions of public entities is possible substantively, this research will further investigate the relation between the observed potentially anticompetitive effects of commercial divisions of public entities and competition law provisions focused on unilateral conduct.…”

Section: Collusion (101 Tfeu)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Commercial Divisions of Public Entities and the Limits of EU Competition Law

Sluijs

2019

SSRN Journal

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and scholars at TILEC, ASCOLA, and the Hungarian academy of sciences for helpful comments and suggestions during the various stages of researching and drafting this paper. Special thanks go out to the LLM students in my 'Government as a Competitor' clinic and thesis student Bart van Hemessen, together providing a small army of research assistants. No outside funding was received or relied upon for this paper.

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Section: Collusion (101 Tfeu)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Commercial Divisions of Public Entities and the Limits of EU Competition Law

Sluijs

2019

SSRN Journal

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“…The intuition is as follows. A …rm that belongs to the smallest component has two disadvantages: (i) it has a larger number of competitors in its home market than any …rm that belongs to a greater alliance, and (ii) if the antitrust authority detects its agreements, it loses pro…ts on markets where it does not collude, 16 and they are larger than the same kind of pro…ts of a …rm that belongs to a larger cartel. 17 Therefore, if any …rm i 2 g h has no incentive to renege on one agreement, no other linked …rm will have it.…”

Section: Lemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, if, n 1 > n 2 , by (15) and (16), then (n 1 1) 2 (n 1 ) (n 1 1) + (N n 2 + 1) (n 2 ) < (n 2 1) 2 (n 2 ) (n 2 1) + (N n 1 + 1) (n 1 ) or, in other words, if n 1 > n 2 , then (n 1 ) < (n 2 )…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

Roldán

2012

Economics Manag Strategy

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This paper studies how the presence of an antitrust authority affects market-sharing agreements made by firms in oligopolistic markets. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other´s market. The set of market-sharing agreements defines a collusive network, which is under suspicion by antitrust authorities. This paper shows that, from the firm´s point of view, the probability of being caught is endogenous and depends on the agreements each firm has signed. Stable collusive networks can be decomposed into a set of isolated firms and complete alliances of different sizes. While in the absence of the antitrust authority, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, when the antitrust authority is considered, the network is stability depends on the network configuration as a whole. Antitrust laws may have a pro-competitive effect as they give Firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once. JEL Classification: D43, K21, L41

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“…Combinations of various methods prove most successful, i.a. scientific and economic studies [30], artificial intelligence [6][7][8], statistical analysis, hard evidence (e.g. wiretapping and surveillance), demonstrating factual losses of ordering parties, 'leniency' programmes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Collusion and bid rigging in the construction industry: case studies from Poland

Foremny¹,

Kulejewski²,

Anysz³

et al. 2018

Creative Construction Conference 2018 - Proceedings

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Polish economy experienced significant changes during the past 30 years. System transformation that began in the 1980's and was enhanced by Poland's entry to the European Union in 2004 significantly influenced economic development. Apart from tough history experiences, they formed the shape of national economy which can be observed nowadays. It was a long and difficult process. During political and economic rapid changes greater numbers of price collusions and other illegal practices can be observed than during the stable development of national economy. Authors selected and reviewed the most important anti-competitive cases in the construction industry from the past 30 years in Poland. The review includes not only cases that were officially justified and penalized-like the collusion of portland cement big producers-but also cases of collusion suspicion on highway and express roads that ended with acquittal court verdicts.

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The Role of Economics in Cartel Detection in Europe

Cited by 9 publications

References 20 publications

Commercial Divisions of Public Entities and the Limits of EU Competition Law

Commercial Divisions of Public Entities and the Limits of EU Competition Law

Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

Collusion and bid rigging in the construction industry: case studies from Poland

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