The Role of (Dis)similarity in (Mis)predicting Others’ Preferences

Barasz, Kate; Kim, Tami; John, Leslie K.

doi:10.1509/jmr.15.0226

Cited by 23 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…In our studies, we assume that receivers know their preferences, and hence we do not consider welfare gains. This assumption is reasonable in many gift-giving situations and follows previous research in consumer behavior that investigates the factors that influence preference (mis)predictions (e.g., Barasz, Kim, and John 2016; Baskin et al 2014; Lerouge and Warlop 2006).…”

mentioning

confidence: 75%

“…Consumers may have both altruistic and instrumental motives when buying gifts for others (Barasz, Kim, and John 2016; Sherry 1983). Under an altruistic motive, the gift giver tries to please the receiver by buying a gift that satisfies the receiver.…”

Section: A Conceptual Model Of Gift Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This “buy what I like” heuristic may be especially useful when givers have limited information about the receivers’ preferences (Otnes, Lowrey, and Kim 1993). Through observations and interactions with the receiver, gift givers may adjust their own preferences (Barasz, Kim, and John 2016; Lerouge and Warlop 2006). Taking into account the preferences of the receiver increases the likelihood that the receiver likes the gift, improves the symbolic worth of the gift (Belk and Coon 1993), and conveys a message that the giver cares about the receiver (Otnes, Lowrey, and Kim 1993).…”

Section: A Conceptual Model Of Gift Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

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Modeling Gift Choice: The Effect of Uncertainty on Price Sensitivity

Wang

Lans

2018

Journal of Marketing Research

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Gift giving generates high revenues for retailers. It is also marked with significant welfare, or deadweight, loss in that givers tend to pay more than the receivers’ valuation. Previous research has attributed this discrepancy to givers’ inaccurate predictions of the receivers’ preferences. This research demonstrates that reduced price sensitivity is another important source of the deadweight loss: givers use gift prices to signal the importance of their relationship with the receiver. In order to demonstrate this mechanism, the authors develop a new Bayesian gift-choice model that captures both preference predictions as well as the signaling value of price. The model is estimated on two choice-based conjoint studies for gift giving that allow for the manipulation of the giver's uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. Both studies show the strong signaling value of price, especially when givers are uncertain about receivers’ preferences. Decomposition of the deadweight loss shows that the signaling value of price is an important source of welfare loss, especially in markets with heterogeneous prices. These findings have key implications for the gift industry.

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mentioning

confidence: 75%

Section: A Conceptual Model Of Gift Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Conceptual Model Of Gift Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

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Modeling Gift Choice: The Effect of Uncertainty on Price Sensitivity

Wang

Lans

2018

Journal of Marketing Research

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“…Moreover, future work could explore additional mechanisms that might underlie the effects of preference suppression on the FCE, as many psychological phenomena are multiply determined. Further research efforts could also be directed toward exploring whether our findings generalize to other decision contexts (e.g., negotiations; Barasz, Kim, and John 2016).…”

Section: Future Research Opportunitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Marketers Project Their Personal Preferences onto Consumers: Overcoming the Threat of Egocentric Decision Making

Hattula¹,

Dahl²

2021

Journal of Marketing Research

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This research explores how marketing managers can avoid the so-called false consensus effect—the egocentric tendency to project personal preferences onto consumers. Two pilot studies were conducted to provide evidence for the managerial importance of this research question and to explore how marketing managers attempt to avoid false consensus effects in practice. The results suggest that the debiasing tactic most frequently used by marketers is to suppress their personal preferences when predicting consumer preferences. Four subsequent studies show that, ironically, this debiasing tactic can backfire and increase managers’ susceptibility to the false consensus effect. Specifically, the results suggest that these backfire effects are most likely to occur for managers with a low level of preference certainty. In contrast, the results imply that preference suppression does not backfire but instead decreases false consensus effects for managers with a high level of preference certainty. Finally, the studies explore the mechanism behind these results and show how managers can ultimately avoid false consensus effects—regardless of their level of preference certainty and without risking backfire effects.

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“…Indeed, recent research suggests that one way that people manage the difficulty of predicting others' preferences is by oversimplifying them. For example, people assume that others' liking for one product indicates disliking for a dissimilar product (Barasz, Kim, & John, 2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%