The Role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: Commonalities or Competitive Behaviour?

Abstract

This paper examines China and India's relationship within the ambit of the G20 process and the autonomous BRICS institutional architecture. The evolving relationship of each of these two emerging powers within these different institutional settings demonstrates a degree of agentic commonality and distinction. China's and India's approaches to both the G20 and the BRICS summit processes highlight a combination of status-seeking and hedging behaviour. While China's cautious approach is complemented by assertive leadership in matters of national interest, India's leadership has a very specific orientation towards developmental issues. Whereas China's approach focuses on the United States and the rest of the West, India's approach is increasingly positioned as a response to China.

The BRICS’ New Development Bank: Shifting from Material Leverage to Innovative Capacity

“…At another level, though, this disjunction opens up further potential strains with respect to the solidarity of the BRICS (Chin, 2014, p. 372; see also Cooper and Farooq, 2016). At one level this problem becomes obscured by China's backstopping of the NDB.…”

“…As the others members fall back in terms of capabilities, China has stepped up notably by experimenting creatively with green bonds backed up by viability of Shanghai as a financial center and the use of national credit agencies. At another level, though, this disjunction opens up further potential strains with respect to the solidarity of the BRICS (Chin, 2014, p. 372; see also Cooper and Farooq, 2016). A case in point is the suggestion that the BRICS create a new credit rating agency of their own.…”

China’s Pledge to Civilise “All Under Heaven”

“…A common position is that China is well behind the USA in terms of global responsibility, democratic credibility, and soft power, and is thus a "partial power" (see Shambaugh, 2013). As a consequence, China, often in alliance with Russia or the BRICS (see Cooper and Farooq, 2016), has concentrated on real or symbolic defiance of the perceived Western order such as in the South China Sea, in Taiwan and Tibet, and in relation to human rights. It has adopted radical and new approaches, dubbed "sharp power," including cyber-attacks, espionage, and extraordinary forms of control over internal opposition, minorities, and external actors like the Chinese diaspora (National Endowment for Democracy, 2017; US State Department, 2020).…”

India and the BRICS A Cautious and Limited Engagement

“…The BRICS is often seen as a hedging strategy in a transitional and highly uncertain world. According to Cooper and Farooq (2016), 'status seeking' and 'hedging' have been the core interest of India and China at the BRICS. China has tried to hedge against the United States, India's does the same against China (Cooper & Farooq, 2016, p. 73).…”

“…The 'strategic triangle' involving India, China and Russia finally culminated in the BRICS with two additional members-Brazil and South Africa (Mohan, 2017). The RIC and the IBSA can, therefore, be taken as precursors to the BRICS (Cooper & Farooq, 2016;Kumar, 2017). In other words, there is an ideational and institutional ancestry to the emergence of the BRICS.…”