The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory

Abstract

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.

Extended emotions

“…The embodied emotion thesis, in particular, is fueled by studies suggesting that emotional episodes are partially composed of perceptual, motoric, autonomic, and somatovisceral processes—a range of bodily components at work beyond the brain (for overviews, see Colombetti, ; Damasio, ; Kever, Grynberg, Bayot, & Vermeulen, ; Laird, ; Niedenthal, ). Recent debates have also focused on how emotional appraisal —at one time thought to be a distinctively cognitive component (Solomon, )—depends on extra‐neural bodily processes (Barlassina & Newen, ; Colombetti, ; Maiese, ).…”

Emotion Recognition as Pattern Recognition: The Relevance of Perception

“…Prinz's strategy is officially to claim that the calibration file is part of the cause of the emotion but not constitutive for it. Since at the same time he describes the calibration file as being the essential feature for individuating an emotion, this is, in the end, not a consistent position (Barlassina and Newen, 2013). out of emotions are rather flexible, there is typical behavior for some emotions, such as freezing or fleeing in fearful situations.…”

Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings

“…So, my first suggestion is that we can better understand these feelings as instances of emotional or affective states rather than as instances of cognitive phenomenology. A somatic theory of emotion that ties bodily activations with the representation of external states of affaires or external conditions is key to understand how this can work (Arango‐Muñoz, ; Barlassina & Newen, ; Prinz, ). Felt emotions are perceptions of bodily changes which have acquired the function of indicating certain states of affairs or certain conditions.…”