2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.002
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The role of bank monitoring in borrowers׳ discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations

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Cited by 95 publications
(51 citation statements)
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“…This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of Vashishtha [] that, as a result of an increase in lender monitoring following debt covenant violations, shareholders decrease their demand for information, leading to a reduction in the borrower's voluntary disclosures. However, we acknowledge that a decline in lender monitoring and the consequent information demand from shareholders need not always follow upon CDS initiation.…”
Section: Motivation Related Literature and Hypotheses Developmentsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of Vashishtha [] that, as a result of an increase in lender monitoring following debt covenant violations, shareholders decrease their demand for information, leading to a reduction in the borrower's voluntary disclosures. However, we acknowledge that a decline in lender monitoring and the consequent information demand from shareholders need not always follow upon CDS initiation.…”
Section: Motivation Related Literature and Hypotheses Developmentsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…It can vary depending on the ownership of the companies and the management system which is similarly linked to concerns about political cost, labour union agitation and contractual covenants (Cannizzaro & Weiner, 2015;Khalil & Simon, 2014;Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Vashishtha (2014) found that companies are more interested in secrecy and maintain some reservation in adopting certain accounting standards when a violation of contractual International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting ISSN 2162-3082 2018 covenants occurs. Further, an earlier study by Wallace (1987) reported how management type determines whether a company maintains secrecy in financial statements and how the Nigerian socioeconomic environment encourages such practice owing to the weak legal system.…”
Section: Transparency Versus Secrecy Dimensionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bank monitoring represents one of the most important issues in the finance literature. For at least three decades researchers have examined: (1) why banks dedicate considerable resources to monitoring activities (e.g., Fama ; Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor ; Diamond , ; Qi ; Boot and Thakor ), (2) what impact bank monitoring has on borrower firms (e.g., Ahn and Choi ; Vashishtha ), (3) why bank monitoring intensity varies across borrower firms (Blackwell and Winters ), and (4) what the link is between corporate governance and monitoring (Byers, Fields, and Fraser ).…”
Section: Monitoring Metrics: a Brief Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%