The Rise Predicts the Fall: How the Method of Leader Entry Affects the Method of Leader Removal in Dictatorships

Abstract

How does the way a non-democratic leader takes power affect the stability of her government? Prior research identifies irregular leader entries-those violating the regime's norms for leader selection-to be especially likely to foreshadow subsequent unconstitutional transitions. This paper shows how some forms of irregular leader entry can actually protect leaders from most threats of forced removal from power. When leaders use a strong and loyal coalition of supporters to overthrow their predecessors and their entire ruling regimes, as they do in successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regimechanging coups, they explicitly prove their strength to any potential rivals. These leaders are substantially less likely to be ousted than leaders who take power in ways that do not convey strength so convincingly, such as normal succession and elite reshuffling. We analyze an original dataset of non-democratic leader transitions and show that accounting for the strength demonstrated during a leader's entry to power substantially improves our ability to predict how and when the leader will eventually leave office. * NOTE: The data and all computer code necessary to replicate the results and figures in this analysis will be made publicly available at the authors' homepage on publication. R and Stata 14 were used for all statistical analyses.

Autocratic Stability in the Shadow of Foreign Threats

“…At the same time, F is unable to control the outcome of domestic rulership struggles that follow foreign intervention. For example, even though the US-led coalition experiences in Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan have demonstrated the ability of powerful foreign opponents to force regime change, these interventions have also exposed the inability of foreign actors to control perfectly the political process following regime change (Sudduth and Bell 2018). We stress that our results are not affected when we include the possibility that F could fail to remove H's ruler.…”

Who Punishes the Leader? Leader Culpability and Coups during Civil War

“…10. Note, though, that a more recent research shows that leaders who come to power by overthrowing the previous regime via a coup are significantly less likely to fall in such coup because they can credibly demonstrate their strength to potential rivals (Sudduth and Bell 2018). 11.…”

“…Internal audiences are defined here as "individuals and groups within the government who can coordinate to hold leaders accountable" (Prorok 2018, 5). Though leaders are held accountable in various manners (Sudduth and Bell 2018), I focus on nonconstitutional leader removals because, as Svolik (2012, 4) emphasizes, leader punishment in these cases "most plausibly occurred nonconsensually-against the will of the incumbent leader." Moreover, the principal threat most wartime leaders face stems from internal audiences, including the military.…”

“…The leader-month observation is included in the analysis as long as there are at least 25 battle-related deaths in the previous 12 months or in a calendar year as defined in the UCDP/PRIO conflict dataset. I generate the leader list by using the Archigos version 4.1 (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) for democracies and the dataset used by Sudduth and Bell (2018) for autocracies. To identify civil war, I use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v. 1-20161- (Gleditsch et al 2002Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008).…”

Leadership succession in politics: The democracy/autocracy divide revisited

“…Interestingly, however, while institutionalised succession orders, to the extent they exist, have apparent benefits not just for the overall stability of the regime but also for the security of incumbent rulers, there are still hidden incentives for would-be successors to disregard those rules and to use revolutionary means instead to win power. Sudduth and Bell (2018: 145) demonstrate that ‘leaders that gain power through, for example, successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regime-changing coups, deter subsequent challenges. They are substantially less likely to be ousted than leaders who take power in ways – such as via normal succession or reshuffling among ruling elites – that do not convey strength so convincingly’.…”