The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815

Bonney, Richard

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198204022.003.0001

Cited by 91 publications

(103 citation statements)

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“…That is, most revenue goes to financing the ruler's army, which is consistent with the historical record (Ames and Rapp 1977, Bean 1973, Becker 1966, Bonney 1999, Kedar 1974). …”

Section: Page 9 Of 38supporting

confidence: 77%

“…This means that a trader looses 50% of his goods in a town because of pilfering. The tax level is realistic according to the historical record (Ames and Rapp 1977, Bonney 1999, Greif et al 1994). In England, for example, a tax of about 10% was imposed on movable property in the 13 th century (Ames and Rapp ).…”

Section: Rulersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The ruler always has a minimal army that ensures he can collect taxes and protect his own wealth, but in order to increase the level of property rights enforcement, the ruler must spend additional amounts of income on the army (or police force). The level of property rights enforcement therefore depends on the level of costs that the ruler spends on the army, a realistic assumption (Ames and Rapp 1977, Bean 1973, Becker 1966, Bonney 1999, Kedar 1974.…”

Section: Page 9 Of 38mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 In some European regions, as markets expanded, local medieval rulers gained sufficient powers of property rights enforcement to fulfil the rudimentary functions of the state (Greif et al). The fiscal basis of these advances in the delineation and enforcement of property rights was revenues gained from the medieval tax system emerging between the 11 th and 13 th century (Ames andRapp 1977, Becker 1966;Biddick 1985, Bonney 1999, De Long and Shleifer 1993, Kedar 1974.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The emergence of property rights enforcement in early trade: A behavioral model without reputational effects

Hodgson

Knudsen

2008

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…That is, most revenue goes to financing the ruler's army, which is consistent with the historical record (Ames and Rapp 1977, Bean 1973, Becker 1966, Bonney 1999, Kedar 1974). …”

Section: Page 9 Of 38supporting

confidence: 77%

Section: Rulersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Page 9 Of 38mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The emergence of property rights enforcement in early trade: A behavioral model without reputational effects

Hodgson

Knudsen

2008

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Sometimes even the governments themselves make no secret that their ability to 3 For example, see Brewer (1990) for Britain, Bordo and White (1991) for Britain and France, Bonney (1981) for France, 't Hart, Jonker, and van Zanden (1997) for the Dutch Republic, Pollack (2009) for the United States, Calabria (1991) for the Kingdom of Naples, Broadberry and Harrison (2005, 60) for Germany, and Centeno (2002) for the countries in Latin America. The two collections in Bonney (1995) and Bonney (1999) have excellent summaries for the major European states.…”

Section: Debt and War Financementioning

confidence: 99%

Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms

Slantchev

2012

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Cliometric Approaches to War

Eloranta¹

2015

Handbook of Cliometrics

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This article reviews the economic history of war, a literature that comes not just from economics or from history but from political science and sociology as well. We first cover the review scholarship on the pre-modern period, especially the formation of European nation states and conflicts. It seems clear that Europeans emerged from this period with a comparative advantage in violence, through technological innovations and repeated warfare. Fiscal innovation and the expansion of state's capacity to tax were a key part of the process. The conflicts during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period then changed the nature of warfare and ushered in an era of total war and industrialization. Then came the world wars, the period that economic historians have devoted more attention to than any other. New data and scholarship has shown the mechanics of mobilization and highlighted the importance of resources in deciding these conflicts. By contrast, the subsequent Cold War years have been relatively sparsely studied, at least from the perspective of conflicts or military spending. Given the availability of new data and the opening of many archives, it is highly likely that this state of affairs will change in the near future, and researchers may also shift to questions that arise outside of Europe and western democracies. Overall, economic historians studying war have had an impact on related long-run phenomena such as state formation, empires, and the growth of democracy. Cliometrics is well suited to the study of such topics, given the new panel and time series techniques, the rapid development of computing power, and the many new online databases.

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The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815

Cited by 91 publications

References 0 publications

The emergence of property rights enforcement in early trade: A behavioral model without reputational effects

The emergence of property rights enforcement in early trade: A behavioral model without reputational effects

Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms

Cliometric Approaches to War

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