The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair

Ebels-Duggan, Kyla

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0004

Cited by 21 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Perhaps unsurprisingly, the first formulation of this view arose early in the nineteenth century in an attempt to propel governments to answer policy questions by choosing the option that seemed to maximize happiness for the greatest number of people affected (Miller & Dagger, 2006). As utilitarianism evolved, philosophers debated whether the focus should be on wrong actions that fail to produce happiness, or right actions that produce the greatest amount of happiness for the whole, with the latter ultimately being the hallmark of utilitarianism (Driver, 2014). The fundamental or primary ethical concept of value or goodness in consequentialism is thus in reference to outcomes and, under utilitarianism, some ultimate outcomes (e.g., greatest happiness for all).…”

Section: Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although the authors do not make any such commitment explicit, it is hard for a reader to walk away from that concluding statement without the notion that higher extraversion and emotional stability is more “positive” than higher introversion and neuroticism due to the impact of extraversion and emotional stability on subjective well‐being. And this is at odds with the deontological notion that sometimes having the right motives and doing the right thing will lead to more unhappiness for all (Ebels‐Duggan, 2015).…”

Section: Exemplars Across Psychology Fieldsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some theories take the most basic unit for evaluation to be events or outcomes, others actions and intentions, and still others character and persons. For instance, consequentialism's most famous variant, utilitarianism, attributes goodness to states of the world, events, and outcomes; an action is right only if it maximizes good outcomes (Driver, 2012(Driver, , 2014. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the first formulation of this view arose early in the nineteenth century in an attempt to propel governments to answer policy questions by choosing the option that seemed to maximize happiness for the greatest number of people affected (Miller & Dagger, 2006).…”

Section: Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conceptualizing “positive attributes” across psychological perspectives

Wilson

Alonso

et al. 2023

Journal of Personality

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BackgroundThe growth of positive psychology has birthed debate on the nature of what “positive” really means. Conceptualizations of positive attributes vary across psychological perspectives, and it appears these definitional differences stem from standards for “positive” espoused by three normative ethical frameworks: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. When definitions of “positive” do not align with one of these ethical schools, it appears researchers rely on preference to distinguish positive attributes. In either case, issues arise when researchers do not make their theoretical alignment explicit, leading to value‐laden, often subjective criteria being smuggled into science as a description of what is positive.ObjectiveTo foster a deeper critical understanding of the different approaches, we examine how these conceptual definitions of positive attributes (mis)align with their ethical traditions or fail to align with an ethical school.MethodWe review several positive attribute theories across psychological disciplines that serve as examples of the ethical and non‐ethical sources of “positivity.” Through this, we assess the conceptual criteria for what each approach considers “positive,” note the degree of alignment between definition and ethical school, and draw attention to potential issues.ConclusionWe advance the conceptual assessment of positive attributes by considering the implications of failing to explicitly address the theoretical foundation from which a construct is defined.

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Section: Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Exemplars Across Psychology Fieldsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conceptualizing “positive attributes” across psychological perspectives

Wilson

Alonso

et al. 2023

Journal of Personality

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Hopeful Pessimism: The Kantian Mind at the End of All Things

Chignell

2022

Faith, Hope, and Love

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Kant’s third question (“What may I hope?”) is underdiscussed in comparison to the other two, even though he himself took it to be the question that united his efforts in theoretical and practical philosophy. This is largely his own fault: in his discussion of the question he moves quickly from talking about rational hope to discussing the kind of Belief or faith (Glaube) that grounds it. Moreover, the canonical statements of his own moral proof do not seem to give hope any essential role to play. In this chapter I first consider the ways in which pre-Kantian authors muddied the distinction between what we would call “hope” and “expectation.” I then look at how Kant’s views about hope evolve to the point where, by the time of the “End of All Things” essay of 1794, he seems to endorse a kind of hopeful pessimism about our this-worldly situation, at least. I then examine a version of Kant’s moral proof that succeeds in locating a role for hope that is distinct from that of Belief, expectation, optimism, and so on. Finally, I turn to some contemporary work in two very different arenas – Anthropocene scholarship and Christian eschatology – in order to look at how the concepts of hope and optimism are deployed in those contexts. We will see that although some of the recent discourses about the “Good Anthropocene” slip beyond hope into full-blown optimism, most authors working on ecological and environmental topics are careful to keep the attitudes distinct. By contrast, there is a tendency among contemporary theologians to follow earlier Christian authors in slipping beyond mere hope to optimistic faith, and even to full-blown certainty.

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Kant as a carpenter of reason: the highest good and systematic coherence

Englert

2024

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

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What is the highest good actually good for in Kant's third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good's practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with 'bündiges' thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in the third Critique's moral proof for God's existence. I show that the original meaning of 'bündig', which is a forgotten term from the carpentry trade, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant's system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant's proof for God's existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant's reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labor costs.

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The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair

Cited by 21 publications

References 0 publications

Conceptualizing “positive attributes” across psychological perspectives

Conceptualizing “positive attributes” across psychological perspectives

Hopeful Pessimism: The Kantian Mind at the End of All Things

Kant as a carpenter of reason: the highest good and systematic coherence

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