The “Revolving Door” between Regulatory Agencies and Industry: A Problem That Requires Reconceptualizing Objectivity

Abstract

There is a ''revolving door'' between federal agencies and the industries regulated by them. Often, at the end of their industry tenure, key industry personnel seek employment in government regulatory entities and vice versa. The flow of workers between the two sectors could bring about good. Industry veterans might have specialized knowledge that could be useful to regulatory bodies and former government employees could help businesses become and remain compliant with regulations. But the ''revolving door'' also poses at least three ethical and policy challenges that have to do with public trust and fair representation. First, the presence of former key industry personnel on review boards could adversely impact the public's confidence in regulatory decisions about new technology products, including agrifood biotechnologies. Second, the ''revolving door'' may result in policy decisions about technologies that are biased in favor of industry interests. And third, the ''revolving door'' virtually guarantees industry a voice in the policymaking process, even though other stakeholders have no assurance that their concerns will be addressed by regulatory agencies. We believe these three problems indicate a failure of regulatory review for new technologies. The review process lacks credibility because, at the very least, it is procedurally biased in favor of industry interests. We argue that prohibiting the flow of personnel between regulatory agencies and industry would not be a satisfactory solution to the three problems of public trust and just representation. To address them, regulatory entities must reject the traditional notion of objectivity. Instead they should adopt the conception of objectivity developed by Sandra Harding and re-configure their

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