The Reverse Majority Voting under the ‘Six Pack’: A Bad Turn for the <scp>U</scp>nion?

Palmstorfer, Rainer

doi:10.1111/eulj.12034

Cited by 25 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…However, the threat was 'never on the table' (Interview S). One difficulty with it was that the secondary law approach was chosen because it was faster than amending the treaty -i.e., the other real option for the Member States in 2010-11 (Palmstorfer, 2014).…”

Section: Rational-choice Institutionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The European Parliament and economic governance: explaining a case of limited influence

Bressanelli

Chelotti

2018

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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acting [together] in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure'. With the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis, the EP made immediate use of its new powers. The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was negotiated under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) and, between September 2010 and February 2013, the EP and the Council established new rules for budgetary surveillance and macroeconomic coordination. With the approval of the two legislative packages known as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack, for the first time the EP had the opportunity to shape the rules of the EMU.The literature has provided very different assessments of the role of the EP in the reform of the EMU. On the one hand, the EP has traditionally not shied away from using its powers as a colegislator (Corbett et al., 2016); with its new legislative powers, several scholars observed that the EP's impact has indeed been significant (Fasone, 2013;Héritier and Schoeller, 2015;Laffan and Schlosser, 2016). Even advocates of the 'new intergovernmentalism' recognise that the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack are an exception to their story (Fabbrini, 2013). On the other hand, other scholars noted that the EP was not very successful in pushing its preferences through, particularly on economic issues (Bressanelli and Chelotti, 2016;O'Keeffe, Salines and Wieczorek, 2016).This article presents an in-depth study of the influence of the EP in the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack.It has both descriptive and explanatory purposes. Descriptively, it aims to provide a systematic map of the negotiations focusing on the key controversies -i.e. important issues where the actors have different positions (Thomson, 2011, p. 29). To assess the EP's influence, we compare its position before starting the negotiations with the Council to the initial legislative proposals and the final legislative output. i This is complemented by an account of the genesis of the two packages. We anticipate here that the EP's influence has been modest at best. In the second part of the paper, we 2 explain this puzzling finding. Relying on rational and sociological institutionalism, we show that the more favourable BATNA of the Council could explain the outcome of the Two-Pack, and a norm of responsibility triggered by the crisis could account for the limited impact of the EP on the Six-Pack. Yet, we are not fully satisfied by the extant explanations, and advance a new, additional hypothesis. We suggest that in policy areas close to 'core state powers' (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2013), like budgetary surveillance, the Member States still play a primary role, and the EP finds itself acting within the boundaries that they define. Our policy-based explanation contends that the EMU -and, possibly, other policies close to core state powers -have their own dynamics, where the Member States are still the 'masters', and the EP has a more subordinate position. While we do not completely dismiss the importance of the f...

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Section: Rational-choice Institutionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The European Parliament and economic governance: explaining a case of limited influence

Bressanelli

Chelotti

2018

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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“…Finally, while the Council of Ministers retains significant power to adopt Commission proposals under these procedures, their extent and volume, as well as the move to reversed qualified majority voting, make it far more difficult for the Council to do so (Palmstorfer, ). This point is further reinforced when one considers the increasing responsibilities – such as for banking supervision – of an institution that neither of these institutions can directly influence: the ECB.…”

Section: Eu Decision‐making ‘After the Fall’mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of ‘Post‐Crisis’ EU Economic Governance

Dawson

2015

J of Common Market Studies

129

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How should decision-making under EU economic governance be understood following the eurocrisis? This article argues, contra existing depictions, that the post-crisis EU has increasingly adopted methods of decision-making in the economic field which marry the decision-making structure of inter-governmentalism with the supervisory and implementation framework of the Community Method. While this 'post-crisis' method has arisen for clear reasons -to achieve economic convergence between eurozone states in an environment where previous models of decision-making were unsuitable or unwanted -it also carries important normative implications. Post-crisis governance departs from the mechanisms of legal and political accountability present in previous forms of EU decision-making without substituting new models of accountability in their place. Providing appropriate channels of political and legal control in the EU's 'new' economic governance should be seen as a crucial task for the coming decade.

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“…Majone (: 1221) argues that the traditional role of national parliaments is thereby significantly altered, and cites the example of the Irish budget that was first revised by Germany before the Irish parliament could examine it. The budgetary requirements are enforced under the ultimate shadow of sanctions foreseen by the EDP, unless Council objects via the peculiar (with regard to democratic standards) procedure of a reverse qualified majority vote (Palmstorfer, ). In the case of the ES, the Commission has a significant margin to interpret the prescriptions in a more or less rigid way (Vanheuverzwijn, ).…”

Section: Asymmetric Intergovernmentalism and The Imposition Of A “Dismentioning

confidence: 99%

The European Semester: Democratic Weaknesses as Limits to Learning

Papadopoulos¹,

Piattoni²

2019

European Policy Analysis

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In this contribution to the symposium “What's the problem? Multilevel governance and problem‐solving,” we discuss possible reasons that make difficult for the European Semester to achieve the goals of developing mutual learning and the acquisition of “ownership” over fiscal restraint, budgetary coordination and structural reforms. We underscore the uneasy coupling of a “soft” multilevel governance mode with “hard” forms of governance associated with power politics and domination. We claim that four major problems undermine the Semester's credibility and effectiveness: (1) a democratic deficit resulting from executive dominance, the relative sidelining of parliaments and the marginalization of the public, which confine learning to governmental and administrative circles; (2) the constitutionalization of budgetary policy choices, which constrains the available policy options and preempts reflection and discussion; (3) the “disciplinary logic” imposed through asymmetric intergovernmentalism, which invites noncompliance or bargaining, and (4) the “tough” treatment of debtor Eurozone members outside the Semester.

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The Reverse Majority Voting under the ‘Six Pack’: A Bad Turn for the Union?

Cited by 25 publications

References 0 publications

The European Parliament and economic governance: explaining a case of limited influence

The European Parliament and economic governance: explaining a case of limited influence

The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of ‘Post‐Crisis’ EU Economic Governance

The European Semester: Democratic Weaknesses as Limits to Learning

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