The return trip effect: Why the return trip often seems to take less time

Ven, Niels van de; Rijswijk, L. van; Roy, Michael M.

doi:10.3758/s13423-011-0150-5

Cited by 28 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Most accounts rely on the assumption that there is a mechanism directly mapping physical time into perceived time, i.e. a neural ' clock' or 'pacemaker' (Block & Zakay, 1996;Matell & Meck, 2004;Treisman, 1963;Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, & Brogan, 1990). Among these, the prominent pacemakeraccumulator model proposes that duration perception arises from a process wherein a pacemaker generates sequential neural pulses that are stored in an accumulator: according to this suggestion, the number of pulses accumulated over a certain interval constitutes the brain's estimation of the duration of that interval (Church, 1984;Treisman et al, 1990).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…a neural ' clock' or 'pacemaker' (Block & Zakay, 1996;Matell & Meck, 2004;Treisman, 1963;Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, & Brogan, 1990). Among these, the prominent pacemakeraccumulator model proposes that duration perception arises from a process wherein a pacemaker generates sequential neural pulses that are stored in an accumulator: according to this suggestion, the number of pulses accumulated over a certain interval constitutes the brain's estimation of the duration of that interval (Church, 1984;Treisman et al, 1990). A variation of this model proposed that perceived duration depends on the functioning of multiple neural oscillators, each with phasic activity operating on different timescales (Matell & Meck, 2004;Mauk & Buonomano, 2004;Treisman et al, 1990;van Rijn, Gu, & Meck, 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Perceptual content, not physiological signals, determines perceived duration when viewing dynamic, natural scenes

Suárez-Pinilla¹,

Nikiforou²,

Fountas³

et al. 2018

Preprint

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The neural basis of time perception remains unknown. A prominent account is the pacemaker-accumulator model, wherein regular ticks of some physiological or neural pacemaker are read out as time. Putative candidates for the pacemaker have been suggested in physiological processes (heartbeat), or dopaminergic mid-brain neurons, whose activity has been associated with spontaneous blinking. However, such proposals have difficulty accounting for observations that time perception varies systematically with perceptual content. We examined physiological influences on human duration estimates for naturalistic videos between 1-64 seconds using cardiac and eye recordings. Duration estimates were biased by the amount of change in scene content. Contrary to previous claims, heart rate, and blinking were not related to duration estimates. Our results support a recent proposal that tracking change in perceptual classification networks provides a basis for human time perception, and suggest that previous assertions of the importance of physiological factors should be tempered.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual content, not physiological signals, determines perceived duration when viewing dynamic, natural scenes

Suárez-Pinilla¹,

Nikiforou²,

Fountas³

et al. 2018

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…So when there are expected durations, time intervals undergo contrast; perceptions move away from expectations. This sort of phenomenon appears to be a contributor to the return trip effect-the tendency for journeys to seem longer than the subsequent return trips (van de Ven, van Rijswijk, & Roy, 2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

Effects of expectations on loudness and loudness difference

Parker

Moore

Bahraini

et al. 2012

Atten Percept Psychophys

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To determine how expectations affect loudness and loudness difference, in two experiments we induced some subjects to expect loud sounds (condition L), some to expect soft sounds (condition S), and others to have no particular expectations (control). In Experiment 1, all subjects estimated the loudnesses of the same set of three moderately loud 1-kHz tones. Estimates were greatest for subjects in condition S and smallest for subjects in condition L. Control subjects' estimates were intermediate but closer to those of condition S subjects. In Experiment 2, subjects estimated the difference in loudness for pairs of moderately loud 1-kHz tones. Again, estimates were smallest for condition L subjects; estimates were greatest for control subjects, and condition S subjects' estimates were closer to control estimates than to condition L estimates. This pattern of results is explainable by a combination of (1) Parducci's (1995) range-frequency theory and (2) a gain control mechanism in the auditory system under top-down governance (Schneider, Parker, & Murphy, 2011).

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“…We might name this model a "feedback mode," with the ability to include previous models (Model 4 in Figure 8), suggesting that a specific action predicts a specific outcome (and vice versa). Therefore, during agentive action, we have a special conscious state to wait/prepare for the predicted sensory outcome (e.g., return-trip effect (Maglio & Kwok, 2016;van de Ven, van Rijswijk, & Roy, 2011)). The previous models have suggested that our subjective "duration" as a figure is dilated (Model 2), but "interval" as ground might be compressed (Model 3).…”

Section: Bayesian "Feedback Mode" (Model 4)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

Asai

Imaizumi

Imamizu

2019

Preprint

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How can we certify our existence? Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. While this Bayesian view of the sense of agency is widely accepted, empirical evidence in support of this theory is still lacking. The current study examined outcome-modulated agency in terms of time perception in seven experiments, with a total of 90 participants. It was hypothesized that perceptual generation, not termination, should subjectively infer the existence of the self, even though both include the same stimuli and are driven by the same teleological action.Results suggest support for the hypothesis (Experiments 1 and 2). Participants judged stronger self-agency, detected less delay, or felt shorter duration for auditory generation, compared with termination, which was driven by the same volitional key-press. Furthermore, the main experiment, Experiment 3, focused on temporal probability distributions both for action and outcome (e.g., standard deviations or relative entropy), and concluded that the observed contrast in onset/offset agency indicates a mutual or bidirectional relationship between cause and effect only during agentive action, characterized by active (i.e., teleological) generation.Finally, the concurrent theoretical models for volitional action-modulated time perception are discussed on the basis of the suggested triplet (generativity, teleology, and subjectivity) dimensions of agency. Extended abstractThe sense of agency refers to the subjective experience of generating one's own actions (Gallagher, 2000).Within the past decade, research on this subject has increased, as increased understanding of human agency could be a window into knowing how we are aware of ourselves, and possibly allowing for a better understanding of mental illnesses, like schizophrenia. However, "free will," "self-consciousness," and/or "volition" are concepts that are always difficult to empirically investigate (Frith & Haggard, 2018).Researchers do not know exactly what occurs in our sensorium during "agentive action." However, three conceptions could represent genuine dimensions of agency: generativity, teleology, and subjectivity (Haggard, 2019).Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. This Bayesian view of the sense of agency may provide an explanation for classical statements, such as "ego cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am)," "cogito cogito, ergo cogito sum (I think that I think, therefore I think that I am)," "I move, therefore I am," or "I predict, therefore I am." (e.g., Corlett, 2017). All of these theoretical claims implicitly refer to the Bayesian "inverse" probability or inference (e.g., "thought as action"), where the effect (perception) retrospectively postdicts the cause (action), as well as the action predicting the following perception (Figure 1, including generativity, teleology, and subjectivity as ...

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The return trip effect: Why the return trip often seems to take less time

Cited by 28 publications

References 17 publications

Perceptual content, not physiological signals, determines perceived duration when viewing dynamic, natural scenes

Perceptual content, not physiological signals, determines perceived duration when viewing dynamic, natural scenes

Effects of expectations on loudness and loudness difference

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

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